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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Deep global poverty persists despite decades of coordinated development efforts seeking 
to eradicate it.  Recent literature has taken a new approach to defining the underlying 
mechanisms of lasting poverty in terms of asset ownership and the ways in which households 
accumulate productive assets over time.  Using a panel data set from Bangladesh, this study 
identifies the productive assets of rural households in three different study sites over two rounds.  
Using panel fixed effects methods and a non-parametric lowess estimator, the expected 
household asset accumulation trajectory is predicted to determine if households are stuck in a 
poverty trap.  The results indicate that, on average, households are escaping asset poverty and 
increasing consumption expenditures in part due to a broader asset base over time.  There is no 
evidence for low-level poverty traps. 
 The observed growth may be dependent on development initiatives seeking to intervene 
to raise household income.  This study then turns its attention to the microfinance phenomenon 
unfolding across rural Bangladesh.  Growth in household per capita expenditures over two 
periods is explained as a function of the duration of access to microfinance services.  In two of 
the three study sites, access to microfinance services appears to have no effect on growth.  In the 
third site, there is evidence that microfinance institutions preferentially opened branches in 
villages susceptible to negative covariate shocks.  The households in those villages likely 
increased their consumption over time as a result of their access to microfinance services. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Statement of Problem 
 For many of the two billion people living on less than two dollars a day, poverty has 
become an inescapable facet of daily life from which no escape is readily attainable.  The 
persistent nature of global inequality despite decades of ongoing relief and assistance suggests 
that in some cases the root causes of poverty are often misunderstood or overlooked.  Amid the 
battle against destitution waged by governments and international agencies, the United Nations 
introduced the Millennium Development Goals as a global effort, among other targets, to halve 
the incidence of extreme poverty in developing nations by the year 2015 (United Nations 2010).   
Completing this goal and, in time, surpassing it will require more than the political will or the 
donor funding to finance such an ambitious project; instead, a deeper understanding of the true 
causes of poverty is paramount for targeting effective interventions.  This knowledge bridges the 
chasm between a short-term treatment of the symptoms of extreme poverty and long-term, 
sustainable solutions that break the cycle permanently. 
 The explanations for the existence and lasting nature of poverty are varied.  
Macroeconomic theorist Robert Solow attempted to explain the behavior of large economies in 
terms of the convergence of nations’ welfare over time contingent on capital, labor, and the 
capacity of technology to mitigate barriers to growth.  Over time, he postulated, an economy 
would tend to grow or diminish to a particular equilibrium at which it would stabilize until 
technological change permitted further development (Solow 1956).  With more empirical 
evidence, this theory was refined into the club convergence hypothesis which observed that 
countries, rather than settle at a global equilibrium, tend to converge at different levels of growth 
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conditional on local governance, policy decisions, resource-constrained production capacity, and 
the adoption of region-appropriate technology (Sachs and Warner 1995). 
 These theories of macroeconomic growth are to an extent a reflection of the 
microeconomic underpinnings of national output.  A nation’s convergence on an economic 
equilibrium may in part derive from its citizens’ capacity to use productive means to their 
advantage (Barrett 2005).  Specifically, a household’s ownership of productive assets has the 
potential to determine whether that household can lift itself out of poverty.  Absent functioning 
credit markets or interventions from outside agencies, a household with too few productive assets 
to reliably generate a steady, predictable flow of income may remain stuck in a low-level 
expenditure equilibrium.   This situation, known as a poverty trap, is precisely the target for 
development initiatives seeking to reduce global income disparities (Liverpool and Winter-
Nelson, 2011).  Before poverty traps can be navigated, they must be identified with appropriate 
methods to verify which policy interventions are necessary. 
 Households may experience more binding constraints to overcoming poverty traps if their 
access to credit is limited or nonexistent.  If the current level of asset ownership is insufficient to 
permit the growth of farming or enterprise activities, the ability to borrow against future earnings 
in exchange for immediate acquisition of productive means would substantially lower the 
barriers to escaping poverty (Adato, Carter, and May 2006).  The recent innovation of 
commercial and charitable microfinance in the last four decades has brought this vital credit to 
poor rural areas where households lack even the most basic forms of collateral required by 
traditional financial institutions.  
Rural Bangladesh, widely considered the birthplace of the modern microfinance industry, 
is an ideal testing ground for the long-term efficacy of rural credit markets to bolster households’ 
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asset base.  The concept of microcredit—small-scale loans with high interest rates and short 
repayment windows—promises to deliver capital to start or expand a business, invest in a child’s 
education, or buffer negative shocks to allow smoother consumption over time (de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005).  Whether microfinance institutions can live up to this promise, and in what 
contexts they can do so, continues to be the subject of intense scrutiny in current literature.  
There remains a gap in the understanding of whether microcredit agencies provide services 
appropriate for accumulating assets and escaping poverty or whether lasting poverty reduction 
requires another targeting mechanism. 
Bangladesh has experienced an impressive rate of growth, especially among its poorest 
citizens, during the course of the last two decades.  Over 80 percent of Bangladesh’s poor live in 
rural areas (Narayan, Yoshida, and Zaman 2007) but development of rural infrastructure since 
the early 1990s has brought new access to economic opportunities through the extension of 
roads, bridges, and electrification to many rural communities (Khandker, Bakht, and Koolwal 
2009).  As a result of these and other agricultural and industrial developments, the national 
poverty rate has fallen from 60 percent to 50 percent in the period from 1991 to 2010 (Khandker 
and Koolwal 2010).  In the same time period, the under-five mortality rate declined sharply from 
151 to less than 61 deaths per thousand live births (Hossain 2010).  The net enrollment rate of 
children in primary education rose from 60.5 to an impressive 91.1 percent, with the ratio of 
enrolled girls to boys shifting from 0.83 to 1.03 (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2010).  
Nevertheless, Page et al. (2009) report that over half of the rural population may be considered 
landless, with ultra-poor subsistence farmers frequently surviving on less than a dollar a day.  
Many households in this study belong to this poor farming class, but a great deal are also the 
beneficiaries of the tremendous wave of growth that has transformed rural communities since 
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1990.  Access to microfinance may be one factor among a landscape of new development 
programs contributing to the capacity of households to grow their way out of poverty traps. 
 
1.2  Significance 
While it has been suggested that lack of credit is the primary constraint to growth in 
households facing poverty traps (Carter and Barrett 2006), virtually no studies exist that attempt 
to link asset-based income changes to the availability of loans.  Credit impact studies are not 
new, especially in the microfinance hotspot of Bangladesh where such development programs 
have been operating for decades (Yunus and Jolis 2003).   By attempting first to identify the 
pattern of asset dynamics, however, this paper seeks to explain the impact of rural financial 
services in a new context that will expand the understanding of the long-term consequences of 
the availability of credit and savings. 
In addition, the consideration of asset dynamics among the poor could have implications 
for the way in which microfinance institutions (MFIs) deploy their services.  Many providers, 
especially in Bangladesh, rely on arbitrary cutoffs of measurable wealth indicators to determine 
whether a potential client is eligible for a loan; in many cases 0.5 acres or less of owned land is 
the soft rule for establishing membership (Zeller 2001).  While these rules rely on proxies of 
poverty, a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that drive poverty would allow MFIs to 
accurately tailor their serves to the appropriate population for maximum impact. 
This study seeks to improve upon the previous work of Quisumbing and Baulch (2009), 
who explore the same data set for poverty traps and asset dynamics.   Where their model uses 
household characteristics and shocks to explain the expected changes in various types of asset 
holdings, this study instead attempts to identify a structural basis to expenditures by creating an 
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index of human, physical, natural, and social capital to predict a household’s expenditures.  Asset 
holdings, instead of being the outcome, will be used as the explanatory foundation of movements 
into and out of poverty.  The conclusions about the general pattern of poverty reduction are 
strikingly different when compared to the results of Quisumbing and Baulch, and have disparate 
implications for the future of development in rural Bangladesh. 
 
1.3  Objective 
This study seeks to address questions about the relationship of asset poverty to the 
popular microfinance phenomenon in Bangladesh.  Specifically, it will attempt to identify: (1) 
whether rural households face the prospect of poverty traps; (2) if a poverty trap exists, at what 
approximate level of asset ownership a household is likely to fall into a poverty trap; and (3) 
what role, if any, microfinance has played in overcoming asset poverty. 
 
1.4  Background 
1.4.1  Measuring Poverty: Why the Method Matters  
 The response to poverty inevitably differs based on the quantitative lens used to examine 
the welfare of the subjects under study.  Because different measures of poverty relay different 
information about its prevalence, depth, and persistence, the appropriate measure must be 
matched to the intention of the agency seeking to alleviate the problem.  In other words, the way 
poverty is measured matters. Carter and Barrett (2006) identify several ―generations‖ or 
strategies of poverty measurement that have evolved as the theory of poverty has become more 
sophisticated. 
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The most basic and familiar method is a single-period household-level account of total 
liquidity flows.  Although income may be used for this purpose, in rural agrarian communities 
income is a highly seasonal indicator that typically demonstrates large upswings just after 
harvest and steadily declines throughout the year.  Expenditures, however, are less susceptible to 
variability because they reflect the steady consumption of necessities and are often the preferred 
proxy of household welfare (Carter and Ikegami 2009). From this measurement a cross-sectional 
perspective of a country’s wealth structure can be created based on a predetermined poverty line 
representing the cost of basic needs, including food and durable consumption.  An expenditure-
poor household is identified as one whose observed expenditures lie below the poverty line.  
Such a simple categorization may not provide sufficient evidence of true need, however; 
consider the classic case of a frugal graduate student who exhibits expenditures far below 
average but is rarely in need of an anti-poverty intervention.  People may choose a present state 
of reduced consumption in exchange for higher expected future returns, as in the case of the 
investment in higher education.  Therefore, separating the financially mobile from the financially 
rigid requires more information. 
This information comes in the form of a two-period or ―dynamic‖ household flow 
measurement which reveals the extent of household mobility into and out of poverty.  With an 
additional period of observations, an important distinction about the different kinds of poverty 
can be made: chronically poor households fail to show expenditures above the poverty line in 
either period; transitorily poor households show expenditure poverty in one period but not the 
other; and never poor households show expenditures above the poverty line in both periods.  
This measure distinguishes those who transition into and out of poverty, but cannot identify the 
7 
 
causal factors responsible for such a transition (Echavez et al. 2007).  Moreover, flow-based 
variables suffer from a high probability of measurement error and recall bias (Wooldridge 2002). 
 Responding to these limitations, the third strategy of poverty measurement points to the 
possession of productive assets as the underlying mechanism driving either the stasis or 
transition of observed expenditure poverty states.  An asset-based approach relies on the 
assumption that, in credit-constrained rural households, productive assets including human, 
social, and physical capital form the basis for income generation.  Though they may fluctuate 
with idiosyncratic shocks or windfalls, expenditures tend to gravitate toward a specific level of 
wealth predicted by the returns attainable with a given combination of assets, absent access to 
credit which may provide consumption opportunities exogenous of assets (Carter and May 
2001).  From this idea, an asset poverty classification may be derived: households owning 
productive assets that predict a level of expenditures above the poverty line are considered asset-
nonpoor, while households whose assets fail to generate such expected expenditures are 
considered asset-poor.  Regardless of expenditure poverty status, in the long run asset-poor 
households are unlikely to possess the means to sustain a nonpoor standard of living (Adato, 
Carter, and May 2006).  Therefore development economists are particularly interested in the 
pattern of asset dynamics over time as an indicator of the structural growth of poor populations.  
With panel data on asset ownership, trends in asset growth may be identified to determine if, on 
average, households are accumulating assets or converging on a certain level of assets over time. 
 The existence of asset poverty and its implications for expenditure poverty mandate 
specific approaches to development initiatives.  If asset poverty is truly a more fundamental 
problem than expenditure poverty, then proactive policies may minimize the risk of poverty 
traps.  For example, social safety nets may take the form of programs that respond to 
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idiosyncratic shocks and prevent households from falling into asset poverty.  An understanding 
of how assets buoy expenditures may indicate the appropriate level and form of assistance for 
households on the verge of irreversible loss.  On the other hand, for households already 
experiencing asset poverty, targeted aid may addresses their lack of specific productive assets, 
for instance through a direct gift or transfer of physical equipment or training (Barrett 2005).  
More than simply trying to boost a household’s income, this approach attacks the core of 
observed expenditure poverty by providing the means and skills necessary for sustainable 
independent growth. 
  
1.4.2  The Response of Microfinance 
 The development of microfinance may open one path out of poverty by providing the 
capital to invest in productive assets.  Although the microfinance sector is a relatively recent 
innovation, attempts to cultivate savings and credit in poor, rural areas of the world have existed 
for some time.  Credit cooperatives appeared among German pastoralists as early as the 1850s 
and rapidly spread elsewhere in Europe (Ghatak and Guinnane 1999).  By the early twentieth 
century Great Britain had fostered similar group-based lending in India which eventually spread 
to Bangladesh (Woolcock 1998).  Microfinance did not appear as a worldwide phenomenon until 
the 1970s when Vanderbilt-trained Muhammad Yunus, professor of economics at Chittagong 
University in Bangladesh, founded Grameen Bank to provide loans to rural households that 
lacked traditional collateral required by formal banking institutions (Yunus and Jolis 2003). 
 Once Yunus demonstrated the success of the concept on a national scale, other 
organizations followed.  In the subsequent decades hundreds of microfinance institutions 
appeared in dozens of countries across the globe.  Their endurance testifies to the success of the 
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mechanisms by which these providers overcome the basic problems of rural banking.  The 
genius of the original loan model of the Grameen Bank – imitated by most subsequent 
microfinance programs – was its group lending strategy.  The system requires clients, in order to 
be eligible for a loan, to participate in a lending group with four other peers.  One at a time each 
group member may take a small loan and, at regular meetings, repay it in installments.  When 
one loan has been fully repaid, another group member may borrow from the bank (Goetz and 
Gupta 1996). 
 The group members are at once agents for the bank and a kind of collateral for the 
borrower.  The group formation process, undertaken by those seeking the loan, acts as a 
screening process; the bank assumes that only trustworthy citizens will form or be invited into a 
microcredit group because the group’s viability as a whole relies on the integrity of each 
individual.  The regular meetings and repayments ensure a constant monitoring process, both by 
the group and by the larger village community in front of whom repayments are often made.  
Finally, the group is a form of social capital surrendered as collateral.  Should a person fail to 
make a payment, the rest of the group may collectively repay it; otherwise, the group as a whole 
loses loan privileges (Giné and Karlan 2008).  Some MFIs, particularly in urban settings, elect to 
forego group lending schemes because clients typically have fewer close ties to neighbors in 
cities.  Instead, these organizations circumvent collateral problems with other mechanisms: 
serially lower interest rates on future loans may be offered as an incentive for successful 
repayment; ever-larger loan sizes may be given as a reward for responsibly managing the 
previous loan; and a mandatory savings account with a minimum balance may be required before 
taking the first loan (Schicks 2007). 
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The problem of savings is itself a key failure in many rural markets.  Readily liquidated 
assets and cash are rarely safe when stored in the home due to the possibility of theft.  Barring 
safety concerns, large amounts of cash on-hand remain a temptation to household members, and 
research suggests that male-headed households fail to optimally preserve cash stocks for long-
term consumption decisions (Swain and Wallentin 2009).  Without a viable way for income to be 
deposited to more secure long-term storage, the accumulation of savings is rarely successful and 
subsequently a more productive combination of assets remains out of reach.  So desperate are 
many of the poor for the chance to save money that in West Africa, informal roaming deposit 
collectors go door-to-door, take regular payments of cash in installments, and later return a lump 
sum in exchange for a percentage of the total.  In this sense, the depositors pay interest for 
savings instead of receiving interest as they would at a formal bank.  Microfinance can provide a 
more reliable, stable, and accessible savings account, with the kind of structure appropriate for 
the needs of each client (Collins et al. 2009). 
Microfinance institutions desire to reach a range of clients from those with moderately 
low incomes to the poorest of the poor.  In practice, the outreach of MFIs varies based on the 
source of each organization’s funding, and an organization may decide on how to procure its 
funding based on its particular mission and target population.  The more self-sustaining model is 
an institution akin to a commercial enterprise.  Often such MFIs secure startup capital from large 
investors such as governments, but eventually seek independence from external support.  They 
operate on strict budgets and in general charge higher interest rates, occasionally (albeit 
unintentionally) crowding out the ultra-poor.  The foundational assumption of self-sufficient 
organizations is that poor households demand any kind of credit, not just cheap credit, and that 
high marginal returns to the projects of the poor can cover higher interest rates.  In contrast, the 
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charitable MFI model relies on continual financial support to cover many operating costs.  By 
subsidizing the overhead involved in microloans, donors grant MFIs a certain measure of 
flexibility, the chance to reduce the cost of loans, and the ability to increase access to the ultra-
poor.  Many charitable MFIs can use their resources to offer specialized services such as 
financial and business training for their clients.  The common generalization of these two 
management approaches claims that independent, commercial MFIs reach a greater breadth of 
the poor, while subsidized MFIs reach a greater depth of the poor (Morduch 2000).  
Nevertheless, commercial MFIs recognize the financial heterogeneity of their client base, and 
may cross-subsidize loans for the ultra-poor by charging a slightly higher interest rate to their 
wealthier borrowers (Fruttero and Gauri 2005). 
Despite differing business strategies and products tailored to meet the needs of local 
culture, most MFIs share a few core philosophies about lending to the rural poor of developing 
nations.  First, women are the preferred target group because their preferences often align with 
better household outcomes, such as improved child nutrition or more years of education for 
children (Browning and Chiappori 1998).  Though not applicable universally, in general men 
have a higher propensity to spend money on vice goods such as alcohol and tobacco.  In contrast, 
assuming a collective household bargaining model, women tend to channel more money into 
child nutrition and education (Pitt and Khandker 1998; Fafchamps, Kebede, and Quisumbing 
2009).  Second, loan sizes are small and interest rates are relatively high.  The great uncertainty 
around the circumstances for which a loan will be used, and the difficulty in assessing the 
creditworthiness of a potential client, dramatically increase the riskiness of the loan.  From the 
perspective of the organization, charging high interest rates is a mechanism for weeding out any 
would-be borrowers whose proposed project is likely to be unviable or unable to generate high 
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returns.  It also covers overhead costs of small-scale banking (Karlan and Zinman 2008).  
Finally, microloans require frequent installments—sometimes weekly repayments, including a 
payment the minute the loan is disbursed—and reach maturity much more rapidly than 
traditional loans, often in only a few months and rarely longer than a year.  This feature ensures 
that banks can swiftly determine when a client is slipping into delinquency.  Disciplined clients 
enjoy the rigidity and structure of such loans as well; in the face of high annual interest rates, this 
quick repayment schedule means less income is lost to interest (de Aghion and Morduch 2005). 
 Many assessments of microfinance institutions focus on high repayment rates as a key 
indicator of their success.  Primarily anecdotal evidence offered by MFIs points to the increase in 
household expenditures facilitated by loans and specialized training.  This thesis attempts to 
determine the impact of microfinance on the root causes of poverty by assessing the effects of 
MFI services on asset-driven growth in expenditures.  MFIs whose services can effectively 
increase asset holdings may have a more lasting impact on rural poverty than those that simply 
allow a temporary increase in expenditures. 
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CHAPTER 2:  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1  Theory of Poverty Traps 
 As the supportive structure of income-generating activities, assets are characterized as 
household stocks rather than flows and are typically more resistant to transient variation than 
expenditures (Naschold 2009).  This distinction between stocks and flows makes assets an 
inherently forward-looking measure of welfare (Carter and Ikegami 2009) from which the 
definitions of structural and stochastic poverty may be derived.  Figure 1 plots theoretical 
household expenditures on the vertical axis and assets on the horizontal axis.  For the purposes of 
exposition, assets are aggregated into a single, uniform measure designed to represent a 
combination of stocks that yields a particular level of expenditures.  This relationship of assets to 
their expected realized expenditures is stylized as the dashed curve.  As a household increases its 
asset holdings, it may simultaneously increase its expenditures so that it will pass through points 
  and  . 
    and    represent the expenditure poverty line and asset poverty line, respectively.  A 
household whose observed assets lie to the left of    (for example, at  ) is called structurally 
poor because, at least in expectation, it lacks the productive power to consume above the 
expenditure poverty line.  However, should a structurally poor household be observed to have 
expenditures at   (for example, point  ), it becomes stochastically nonpoor, a classification 
which indicates the temporary nature of high consumption in an asset-poor household.  
Similarly, a household with assets around   is considered structurally nonpoor and is expected 
to have expenditures above the poverty line.  Should a shock send the same household from 
point   to point   (the loss of a wage earner’s job, for example), it becomes stochastically poor 
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but is likely to recover its previous consumption level quickly because of a broad productive 
asset base (Carter and May 2001). 
 An asset is considered productive when the stock or resource yields a return either 
directly through income earning potential or indirectly as in the case of enhanced skills or 
knowledge.  Commonly these assets take the form of physical capital, such as land, agricultural 
equipment, livestock, and cooking utensils; social capital, such as peer networks and social 
status; and human capital, such as education level, literacy, and specialized training.  The poverty 
trap hypothesis relies on the traditional microeconomic assumption of diminishing marginal 
returns to assets, or the notion that the benefit of accumulating the next asset shrinks as the 
quantity of the given asset increases (Baulch and Hoddinott 2000).  Thus, for a given autarchic 
accumulation strategy, it follows that a household must work harder and sacrifice more in order 
to continue increasing its output and, subsequently, its expenditures.  Under the assumption of 
utility maximization, a rational household will choose the production and asset-accumulation 
strategy that produces the highest returns with the available resources.  The asset base may grow 
until the marginal cost of the next asset exceeds the marginal benefit it provides, at which point 
the household settles into equilibrium. 
 Locally increasing returns to scale may be driven by the different productivity levels 
attainable with different combinations of assets.  Such locally increasing returns imply the 
existence of several potential asset equilibria.  For a consistently structurally poor household in a 
low-level asset equilibrium, it stands to reason that a ―better‖ accumulation regime with greater 
locally increasing returns must exist out of reach due to some infeasible minimum investment 
requirement.  Achieving this new growth regime is prohibitively costly either because current 
returns to assets are too meager or because setting aside sufficient income would preclude even 
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the most humble subsistence lifestyle.  Households’ converging on several distinct equilibria, 
then, is conditional on initial levels of assets (Lybbert et al. 2004).  Below an equilibrium point, 
high marginal returns allow for further accumulation; with any greater level of assets, rapidly 
diminishing returns make further growth impossible.  If an asset equilibrium predicts an 
expenditure level below the poverty line, then the household is stuck in a poverty trap. 
These asset dynamics allow an analysis of how possession of assets, and therefore 
structural poverty, changes over time.  The poverty trap hypothesis and autarchic accumulation 
can be visualized as in Figure 2, adapted from Adato, Carter, and May (2006).  The horizontal 
axis gives the aggregated measure of household assets in a base period of observation,   ; the 
vertical axis represents the assets of the same households in the following period,     .  The 45-
degree line indicates the equilibrium point along which a household possesses the same 
aggregate assets in the second period as it did in the base period.  In theory, most of observed 
asset dynamics occurs either along the characteristic stylized S-shaped curve or along the dashed 
concave curve. 
The simpler case of convergent asset dynamics places a household’s multi-period asset 
ownership along the dashed curve.  In this particular example, a household beginning with assets 
less than      expects to have more assets in the second period than the first.  If asset dynamics 
follow this growth trajectory, diminishing marginal returns will allow households to accumulate 
assets over time and converge together on one steady equilibrium point, namely    .  If this 
behavior is representative of actual structural growth, then time is an ally of the poor, whose 
large returns to investment will inevitably propel them toward a higher standard of living 
(Hoddinott 2006). 
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The S-curve is a partial representation of asset dynamics with multiple equilibria.  It is 
incomplete only in the sense that, given enough time and observations, the curve could 
theoretically snake across the line         several times in a quasi-sinusoidal wave.  A 
household whose asset combinations place it above the equilibrium line (e.g. between    and 
    ) is one whose assets in period two surpass those in period one; this household is in growth.  
Combinations below the equilibrium line (e.g. between     and   ) indicate a shrinking asset 
base toward   ; this household is reducing its stocks because the marginal cost of maintaining the 
assets exceeds the marginal benefit they provide.  If the asset poverty line in the base period 
exceeds household asset holdings (      ), a poverty trap exists.  Consequently, structurally 
poor households may be further subdivided into those who can escape poverty on their own and 
those whose resources are insufficient to escape (Carter and Barrett 2006). 
These dynamics give rise to an asset vacuum around the unique base period asset level 
  , which is alternately called the asset bifurcation point or the Micawber Threshold.
1
  At this 
critical divide, expected asset accumulation trajectories diverge: households that can commit the 
capital to strategies with locally increasing returns will climb the asset ladder, while those who 
cannot will fall to a lower equilibrium.  Two important implications of this point must be noted.  
First, because the Micawber Threshold is defined by a kind of repulsive asset dynamism, 
pinpointing the actual level at which returns are locally increasing is difficult because, by 
definition, few households should be observed there.  An attempt to measure the precise point of 
divergence would in all likelihood be clouded by uncertainty (Lokshin and Ravallion 2004).  As 
a corollary, the Micawber Threshold is not an iron curtain; it is at best a fuzzy probabilistic 
region.  Different preferences and values may cause households with similar initial conditions to 
                                                          
1 This term, coined by Lipton (1993), alludes to a fictional character in Charles Dickens’ novel David 
Copperfield who, after years of trouble with creditors, finally breaks free of poverty. 
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move in opposite directions near the bifurcation point.  In addition, idiosyncratic or covariate 
shocks, whether positive or negative, may cause a household to cross the threshold and reach a 
different equilibrium than it would have absent the shock (Zimmerman and Carter 2002). 
 
2.2  The Problem of Market Failure 
If asset dynamics do in fact bifurcate and a low-level steady state exists beneath the asset 
poverty line, the possibility of negative shocks presents a nontrivial threat to rural agrarian 
household welfare.  Livestock blight, theft of equipment, unfavorable weather, natural disaster, 
or the death of a family member are just a few examples of the kinds of setbacks that may 
irreversibly drive a household below the Micawber Threshold.  Household coping strategies in 
response to shocks vary widely as a function of pre-shock wealth.  If the ability to trade does not 
collapse in the wake of the shock, wealthy households with a comfortable reserve of stocks tend 
to respond by liquidating excess assets (provided prices remain somewhat stable) in order to 
smooth consumption expenditures as far as is reasonable.  They seek in the short run to maintain 
a constant standard of living while keeping a safe distance from an inevitable collapse into 
poverty (Drèze and Sen 1989). 
On the other hand, asset-poor households tend to engage in the opposite strategy; rather 
than smooth consumption, they instead sacrifice consumption in order to smooth assets.  While 
prima facie this strategy appears counterintuitive—expenditures in such households are likely 
floating just above bare subsistence—an understanding of assets as the primary driver of income 
casts this behavior in a more rational light (McPeak 2004).  Based on qualitative feedback from a 
series of interviews, Barrett (2005) reports that poor farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa can actually 
identify the relevant assets responsible for the endogenous returns that define bifurcation.  It 
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seems plausible, then, that asset-poor households seek to avoid further vulnerability by choosing 
their coping strategy according to their knowledge of higher-return activities lying just out of 
reach.  Near the Micawber Threshold, households will more vigorously pursue this asset-
preserving strategy even as consumption falls to dangerous levels (Carter et al. 2007). 
The rural poor of developing nations are particularly susceptible to negative shocks 
because their initial asset base is small and because market failures prevent access to crucial 
coping services and significantly lengthen the time required for a full recovery.  Exclusions of 
the rural poor from markets takes a variety of forms: economic barriers mean that trade 
opportunities are scarce and off-farm jobs scarcer (Adato, Carter, and May 2006); social barriers 
result from inadequate infrastructure that cuts people off from transportation, communication, 
social services, and the ability to exercise rights of citizenship (Figueroa, Altamirano, and 
Sulmont 1996); and, perhaps most importantly, financial barriers prevent access to vital credit, 
savings, and insurance that have the potential to buffer shocks and permit the asset-poor to 
simultaneously smooth consumption and retain assets (Doocy et al. 2005). 
That the structurally poor often cannot access basic financial services means that the 
bridges out of poverty are few and uncertain.  Banks face extraordinary costs in spreading their 
resources over rural areas, especially when extending loans.  With a large overhead 
administrative cost relative to the small scale at which the poor typically seek to borrow, 
microloans are an unattractive product on the supply side for most commercial banks.  By 
definition, an asset-poor household lacks the substantial collateral that would guarantee a bank’s 
recovery of its capital in the event of default.  Screening potential clients for riskiness becomes 
difficult without reliable references or financial records.  Monitoring and enforcing repayment is 
inefficient at best, and becomes impossible where rule-of-law is weak (McKenzie and Woodruff 
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2008).  The rural banking industry simply could not exist in developing nations until the current 
system of specialized microfinance evolved out of the very challenges that prohibited traditional 
institutions.  Its efficacy as a poverty-fighting measure, however, continues to be the subject of 
intense scrutiny. 
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CHAPTER 3:  REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
3.1  Seeking the Best Poverty Measure 
 The concept of asset dynamics as the structural key to understanding long-term changes 
in poverty is a relatively recent innovation in developmental economics literature.  It blossomed 
out of earlier foundational work on the theory of poverty measurement and, later, poverty 
transitions.  While it is easy to talk about ―poverty‖ and ―the poor,‖ economists have debated for 
decades about what meaning to assign to these terms.  Amartya Sen (1979) describes the two 
principle components of poverty measurement: identification seeks the characteristics that 
separate the poor from the nonpoor; aggregation attempts to combine these characteristics in a 
meaningful way that offers information about specific populations or subpopulations.  Sen 
asserts that poverty lines may emerge from value judgments based on different societies’ 
perceptions of social justice, and that an income method and a more direct method of observing 
consumption both have benefits in defining the poor. 
 Sen inspired years of further philosophical comparisons of poverty measures.  Ravallion 
(1996) notes that different ideas of how income and consumption are used in poverty 
calculations may impact how basic needs are assessed.  He recommends an index based on 
expenditures, access to non-marketable goods, the way in which resources are allocated within a 
household, and personal attributes of household members that indicates their capacity for 
productivity.  Anand and Harris (1994) find that different indicators—one based on income, one 
on expenditure, and one on caloric consumption—do not always reveal that the same people in a 
population are poor.  In addition, these measures have different implications for determining how 
to count the number of poor and how the poor are expected to behave with respect to savings 
rates and economic activity. 
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 One of the seminal contributions to the field of poverty measurement originated from a 
landmark paper by Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984).  Their decomposable ―FGT‖ poverty 
measures include a series of functions capable of computing, based on a predefined poverty line, 
the number of households in poverty, the headcount poverty rate (the breadth of poverty), the 
poverty gap (the depth of poverty), and the squared poverty gap (the structure of the differentials 
among the poor).  The application of these static measures to longitudinal data allows for the 
determination of economic mobility over time that can define the chronically and transitorily 
poor.  Shortly after the proposal of the FGT techniques, Deaton (1989) observed a connection 
between negative shocks and the drawing down of assets, presumably to cope with a loss of 
consumption.  Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) found a similar phenomenon in rural India, though the 
study focused on the loss of human capital—reduced female schooling after a shock—rather than 
physical capital.  Baulch and Hoddinott (2000), using longitudinal data from ten countries 
spanning the globe, confirm that negative shocks foster divergent welfare trajectories among 
different social classes. 
 The complications and controversy surrounding the often subjective and error-prone 
income or expenditures poverty measures lend support to the use of more objective, easily 
quantifiable standards: assets.  In 1993, Alderman and Garcia associated changes in income with 
changes in level of assets in Pakistan.  Scott (2000) made a similar observation for households in 
Chile over an 18-year period starting in 1968, finding significant positive relationships among 
income and education of the household head, land ownership, and location of land.  He also 
found a negative relationship between income and household size.  These findings laid the 
groundwork for the next generation of poverty dynamics studies. 
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3.2  Empirical Findings in Asset Poverty 
 In the last decade, various papers have empirically tested the contribution of assets to an 
escape of poverty.  Echavez et al. (2007) used assets as predictors of the probability of moving 
out of expenditures poverty in the Philippines.  After tracking household-level data for ten years 
and gathering information on activities, possessions, and household characteristics, they used 
multinomial logit analysis to determine which assets were the best indicators of future wellbeing.  
They determined that individual social capital has little effect on moving out of poverty, while 
strong governance and sound rule-of-law slightly increase a household’s probability of becoming 
nonpoor.  The construction of secondary schools and land reform showed a positive effect on 
upward poverty transitions, while the number of community members working outside of a 
village is associated with a low probability of expenditures growth.  Physical assets such as 
livestock provided no significant impacts. 
 In contrast, Carter et al. (2007) examine assets in Honduras and Ethiopia immediately 
following two different shocks (in Honduras, a hurricane; in Ethiopia, a severe drought).  They 
use the natural experiments to gauge the asset response of households hardest hit by the disasters.  
While they do not specifically look for the existence of a Micawber Threshold, they pursue 
evidence of poverty traps.  They confirm graphically and econometrically that pre-shock wealth 
levels play a significant role in the speed and extent to which households recover from large-
scale disasters.  They discover that wealthy households suffer a larger magnitude of asset losses 
during disasters because they possess large amounts of sufficiently liquid stocks to smooth 
consumption.  Poorer households attempt to conserve assets, but despite their relatively smaller 
losses they require more time to return to their pre-shock levels. 
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 Lybbert et al. (2004) describe the asset accumulation behavior of nomadic Ethiopian 
pastoralists.  Their study is unique in that they focus on only one productive asset—livestock—
arguing that among the nomadic people, welfare, social status, and income potential are tied up 
in animals.  With a rich longitudinal data set spanning 17 years, they find that livestock dynamics 
have a textbook pattern of bifurcation and multiple stable equilibria.   Both short-term (one-year) 
and long-term (ten-year) accumulation exhibit the same S-shaped curve indicating that below a 
critical mass of livestock, extensive pastoralism is unprofitable and sedentary farming is a better 
strategy.  Just above the threshold, returns to scale are locally increasing for mobile herding in 
grazing lands. 
 Lybbert et al. allow one asset to explain pastoral welfare, but in asset dynamics literature 
it is common to create an aggregate, one-dimensional measure that summarizes a household’s 
total asset holdings.  Adato, Carter, and May (2006) deploy this method, described in Chapter 5, 
to study asset changes in South Africa, looking for evidence that the racial discrimination of 
apartheid may have left behind a legacy of poverty after its dismantling.  They find strong 
evidence of structural poverty after decades of institutionalized social exclusion of non-white 
citizens from mainstream opportunities.   Similarly in rural Kenya and Madagascar, Barrett et al. 
(2006) isolate divergent asset trajectories, noting especially that the low-level equilibrium in 
Kenya corresponds to an average expected daily income of $0.51 per person, or an annual 
income of just over $186 per person, just shy of the rural poverty line.  Finally, using a multi-
asset index of productive means among farmers in Ethiopia, Liverpool and Winter-Nelson 
(2011) find evidence of multiple stable equilibria and a poverty trap.  The prevalence of 
bifurcated asset dynamics in the literature suggests that the theory of asset poverty holds as 
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predicted by the theory of locally increasing returns, and may be indicative of the underlying 
market failures that are implicated in the existence of poverty traps. 
 
3.3  Empirical Findings in Microfinance 
 The majority of studies that investigate the effects of MFIs on household outcomes find 
that, in the short-run, households are credit-constrained: access to loans and savings allows the 
poor to increase consumption.  Using cross-sectional survey data from Thailand, Kaboski and 
Townsend (2005) demonstrate that villages with access to savings services provided by an MFI 
saw a 26% greater growth in assets compared to control villages.  They note that flexible savings 
accounts result in more effective idiosyncratic shock smoothing without drawing down stocks, 
and that pledged (minimum-balance) savings accounts act as commitment devices for 
households with an otherwise large preference for current consumption. 
Applying propensity score matching techniques to cross-sectional data from Bangladesh, 
Chemin (2008) finds that expenditures in participating households are 2.8% larger than for 
microfinance non-participants; households with credit were also 5% more likely to send girls to 
school, and 3% more likely to do the same for boys, thus investing in human capital.  He 
attributes the higher enrollment gains for girls to pre-existing favoritism of boys who are more 
likely to attend school in the absence of a microfinance program.  Similarly, Khandker (2005) 
makes use of panel fixed effects on data from Bangladesh to determine that a 10% increase in 
female borrowing increases household total expenditure by 0.10%.  Over the course of the study, 
levels of extreme expenditures poverty dropped 2.2% per annum due to participation in 
microfinance.  Although not an explicit goal of the study, these findings hint that credit permits a 
slow growth out of structural poverty. 
25 
 
For entrepreneurial households interested in starting or expanding a business, microloans 
may accelerate growth.  McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) study the effects of a conditional and 
unconditional capital infusion into microenterprises in Mexico and find that, for the most capital-
constrained participants, the grant increased profits by a staggering 20-100% per month.  This 
astounding result corroborates the theory that small, poor, industrious households demonstrate 
extremely high rates of return in assets and may be capable of paying the high interest rates 
required by commercial, self-sustaining lenders.  Reinforcing this result, Menon (2006) indicates 
that the length of membership in a microfinance institution has a positive effect on the ability of 
a household to absorb income shocks and to steady consumption.  Based on her research in 
Bangladesh, she proposes that eligibility to remain a member of a microfinance organization 
should be reevaluated periodically on a case-by-case basis, and that at a certain level of assets the 
household should graduate from microfinance altogether so that institutions can concentrate on 
the poorest members of the community. 
 Liverpool and Winter-Nelson (2010) contribute a rural credit study from Ethiopia, 
discovering heterogeneous effects of access to credit across poverty classes: only never poor 
households increased agricultural technology use.  They posit that the structurally poor 
households in the sample were not in a position to benefit from the cash crop technology that 
local MFIs promoted.  Lacking the appropriate complementary resources, asset-poor households 
were not trained in the skills that would increase their returns to scale.  These findings caution 
that charitable MFIs with development-centered missions and client training must discern the 
appropriateness of its programs for maximum impact on the poorest populations. 
  Maximizing impact is precisely the reason most MFIs restrict loans to women borrowers.  
Pitt and Khandker (1998) point out that female-targeted credit may balance the share of power in 
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household decision-making.  In their credit study in rural Bangladesh, they compare the impacts 
of credit on expenditures when loans are given to both women and men.  For each additional taka 
lent, women add 0.07 taka more than men to annual household consumption expenditure, 
implying that returns to women’s enterprise are larger.  However, the study found that with 
access to credit both men and women are more likely to send their sons than their daughters to 
school because girls are a better substitute for a mother’s time at home than are boys.  If a mother 
busies herself with a new home enterprise, her daughter will attend to the household chores that 
the mother had to abandon.  Total household human capital grows, but the education decision 
favors boys. 
In order for women to be the true beneficiaries of the empowering possibilities of 
microfinance, credit must not be fungible among members of a household.  Unfortunately, this is 
not always the case in Bangladesh, where often women’s control of a loan is not guaranteed.  
Goetz and Gupta (1996) reveal the darker side of the exclusion of men from the rural credit 
market; often male heads of household will confiscate loans from their spouses for their own use, 
or will oblige that the loan be used for productive means over which women traditionally have 
no control.  The study found that, on average, Bangladeshi women retained full or nearly full 
control over a loan only 37% of the time.  Moreover, 28% of the loans were invested in activities 
usually reserved for women, while 56% were used for traditionally male activities.  This kind of 
unbalanced loan control scheme makes women more vulnerable because they are ultimately the 
ones responsible for the repayment.  Even in the face of some men’s abuse of microfinance 
opportunities, female access to credit still has the potential to improve the status of women: the 
exclusion of men from microfinance means that credit becomes a bargaining chip in the 
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collective household for women to access new opportunities, and any specialized training that 
women receive through the MFI is likely to be much less fungible than a loan. 
 The tension between many of these studies is clear: microfinance increases returns to 
assets in Mexico but not in Ethiopia; loans to women in Bangladesh increase expenditures but 
women are unable to control many of these loans.  These contradictions indicate that this 
literature is rife with conflict.  The differences are often cultural, but are also a product of the 
challenges presented in the econometric impact evaluation.  De Aghion and Morduch (2005) 
point out that any evaluation of a program that allows for self-selection leaves itself open to 
disagreement.  Banerjee et al. (2009) suggest that the way to compensate for selection issues is to 
exploit randomized microfinance roll-outs, which they do in rural India.  These opportunities are 
rare, however, due to the typically purposive placement of MFI branches in an attempt to reach 
the poorest communities.  Any microfinance impact evaluation must be mindful of potential 
endogeneity concerns, particularly where self-selection into MFI membership may be highly 
correlated with outcomes of interest. 
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CHAPTER 4:  DATA AND TRENDS 
4.1  Data Set, Sampling, and Surveys 
 The data used for this analysis come from the Chronic Poverty and Long Term Impact 
Study in Bangladesh, conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
2
  
The longitudinal surveys were carried out in order to study the impact of three separate types of 
development initiatives throughout the country: microfinance, dissemination of agricultural 
technology, and conditional food and cash transfers.  Each was studied during a different time 
period and in different villages across Bangladesh.  Although together these surveys do not 
constitute a statistically representative sample of the entire population of Bangladesh, they do 
cover the country’s vast range of agricultural and ecological conditions (Baulch and Davis 2007). 
Bangladesh is divided into several levels of administrative units.  These are, from largest 
to smallest: division, district, thana (or upazila), union, village, and para (a small subunit of a 
village, like a neighborhood).  To give a rough idea of the relative scale of these units, there are 
six divisions in the country, several hundred thanas, and thousands of unions.  This study will 
concern itself principally with household-level impacts but will cover over 100 villages across 
several thanas.  Figure 3 provides a map of the location of each thana studied, and demonstrates 
that the thanas are spatially heterogenous.  Every thana was unique to its study, except for 
Saturia which appears in two different studies. 
 The Microfinance Study (referred to as the MFI Study) is a survey of 350 households 
comprised of 1,811 individuals across seven villages.  It was conducted in three separate rounds 
in 1994 in order to collect data to analyze the formation and outcome of MFI lending and savings 
groups, and the impacts of participation on household-level outcomes.  A community-level 
survey was administered to 120 randomly selected villages, from which seven villages were 
                                                          
2
 For the data source, see Chronic Poverty and Long Term Impact Study in Rural Bangladesh (2010) in references. 
29 
 
selected (also randomly) for the household-level questionnaire.  Households were chosen for the 
survey by stratified random sampling based on landholdings.  The surveys collects information 
regarding demographics, education, employment, illnesses, land ownership, agricultural 
production, asset ownership (including livestock and equipment), food consumption, 
anthropometrics, debt, and use of credit.  Village-level surveys were also administered to the 
recognized community leader, who provided information on the general access to services, 
infrastructure, educational and health facilities, non-governmental (NGO) activities, and large-
scale covariate shocks. 
 The Micronutrients Gender/Agricultural Technology Study (referred to as the Ag Tech 
Study) covered 955 households and 5,541 individuals over 47 villages.  Four waves of 
questionnaires were administered during 1996 and 1997.  The original goal of the study was to 
observe the impact of introduced agricultural innovations on human nutrition outcomes in rural, 
agrarian communities.  The technologies, distributed by local NGOs, consisted of improved 
methods of vegetable farming, group-managed fishponds, and individual fishponds.  No village 
received more than one technology, and not every village received a new technology.  Study 
sites were selected randomly from villages where the NGO had already begun introducing the 
technologies, and villages where the NGO was likely to introduce the farming systems next.  As 
in the MFI Study, household-level and village-level questionnaires were administered.  
Household surveys gathered data on questions similar to those in the MFI Study, but new 
modules included questions about micronutrient intakes, morbidity, more detailed 
anthropometry, and hemoglobin readings for children and women.  Community-level surveys 
added modules that gathered relevant data on agricultural and irrigation practices. 
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 The third and final segment is the Food for Education/Cash for Education Study (referred 
to as the FFE Study).  Encompassing 480 households in 48 villages, this study was conducted in 
two separate rounds in 2000 and 2003.  Due to the data requirements of the present investigation, 
only the data from the 2003 round was selected for the base period.  As the name of the study 
suggests, the questionnaires were designed to assess the impacts of a conditional transfer of food 
or cash to households in exchange for children’s school attendance.  Educational attainment was 
a particular focus of the household survey modules, but the other usual modules—similar to 
those described above—were included to measure demographics, occupations, and assets.   
Village-level surveys interviewed local leaders about school enrollment and literacy in addition 
to economic activities and village infrastructure. 
 Because the time between rounds differs between the three study sites, each site is 
evaluated separately in this analysis.  A general follow-up survey of all households was 
performed in 2007, roughly thirteen years after the MFI study was conducted.  The purpose of 
this effort was, as the title of the data set implies, to allow the investigation of long-term impacts 
of these social interventions and the exploration of whether these populations experienced 
liberation from chronic poverty.  This one-time follow-up collected data similar to the original 
rounds, and also included a ten-year shock recall module to gather information on positive and 
negative economic and life events.  The survey also includes ordinal, qualitative questions that 
allow the responder to reflect on perceptions of poverty and how time has transformed people’s 
understanding of wellbeing relative to the past. 
 The follow-up surveys attempted to reach as many of the original households as possible, 
making these data a true panel.  In the cases where households had split, such as a child’s 
marrying and leaving home, the split households were interviewed in addition to the original 
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household.  However, this investigation concerns itself with asset growth in a single household, 
so only the core households that were interviewed in both rounds are retained for study.  The 
consideration of only core households achieves the most consistent and comparable results, so 
the split households were dropped from the analysis.  In the MFI Study and the Ag Tech Study, 
the large time difference between first survey and follow-up—thirteen and eleven years, 
respectively—lends itself well to the study of asset dynamics.  Asset accumulation can be a slow 
process, and the appearance of evidence for a Micawber Threshold may be even slower.  With 
more time between rounds, the patterns of convergence become clearer.  Nevertheless, there is 
no minimum time requirement; the much shorter time frame of three years between the two 
waves of the FFE Study is also sufficient to conduct the analysis. 
In contrast, the direct effects of microfinance on household outcomes is most easily 
observed within a timeframe of several months or a year.  Providing causal evidence that 
participation in microfinance alone improves child nutrition outcomes, for example, over the 
course of thirteen years is challenging to say the least, especially in a country whose 
development initiatives are as active as those of Bangladesh, where controlling for all potential 
spillover effects may be an intimidating task.  Therefore the chosen specification, detailed in the 
next chapter, attempts to determine how, if at all, the duration of the presence of microfinance 
operations has permitted the improvement of household wellbeing. 
The large gap between survey rounds, especially in the MFI Study and the Ag Tech 
Study, leave the surveys vulnerable to attrition concerns.  If the study populations are in fact 
extremely poor, or if their growth in wealth is extremely rapid, then large numbers may drop out 
of the survey.  Selective migration can thus bias the results in an unknown direction, depending 
on the strength and magnitude of the forces driving the migration.  In a full attrition analysis, 
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Quisumbing (2007) found that the common features of an attritor were better-educated head of 
household, low levels of total asset value, or a higher proportion of dependent household 
members (in particular, members between 5 and 14 years old, and members older than 55). 
Each of these factors may contribute to selective migration of a household out of the 
sample.  With higher education, a household head may be drawn to move his family where there 
are better employment opportunities more suited to his skill level.  Low asset ownership and a 
high dependency ratio may prompt a household to migrate closer to family and social networks.  
These differing reasons for migration will have opposite effects on livelihood within the sample.  
Attrition of highly-educated heads may bias the results downward, while attrition of very poor or 
older households may bias the results upward.  However, overall attrition rates were low, and 
varied by study site.  In the MFI Study, attrition averaged 0.4 percent per year for a total of 5.7 
percent over 13 years; across the three technologies in the Ag Tech site, total attrition over 11 
years averaged 6.5 percent; over three years of the FFE Study, attrition totaled 6.1 percent.  On 
average across the three studies, 93.7 percent of the original household were located and 
successfully re-interviewed, a total average attrition of only 6.3 percent. 
 
4.2  Trends at a Glance 
 Rural Bangladesh contains an active agrarian economy whose crops include vegetables, 
oils, nuts, spices, and fibers such as jute and cotton.  As the crops are diverse, so are the harvest 
seasons: cotton, barley, linseed, and groundnut are harvested in summer; a variety of vegetables 
and oils are harvested after the monsoon season; and pulses, cauliflower, and cabbages, among 
others, become available in the winter (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 1998).  Although the 
months just after the monsoon season—November and December—are typically the time of the 
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largest harvest, the generally steady production throughout the year means that seasonality 
concerns do not present a substantial threat to reliable analyses of farming households.  In fact, 
the data reveal that rates of expenditure poverty during high harvest months are comparable to 
those with less harvest activity. 
 Poverty rates and their changes over time are easily visualized in a transition matrix.  
While not indicative of structural patterns of poverty in itself, a transition matrix provides an 
initial understanding of the financial mobility of a population over time.  Tables 1, 2, and 3 give 
the transition matrix for each study site in this data set.  The matrices report four possible poverty 
classifications based on expenditures and time: a chronically poor household, labeled as poor in 
the first and second round, report expenditures below the poverty line during both surveys.  
Transitorily poor households, on the other hand, show a change of poverty status during the 
course of the study.  These households either begin in poverty in the base period and later exhibit 
expenditures above the poverty line, or begin nonpoor and are later observed below the poverty 
line.  Finally, never poor households report expenditures above the poverty line in both periods.  
Because chronically poor and never poor households show no mobility into or out of poverty, 
they are labeled with a double arrow ( ) to indicate financial stasis through time.  The 
transitorily poor are labeled with an upward arrow ( ) if they belong to the group that exited 
expenditures poverty, and a downward arrow ( ) if they fell into poverty from the first to second 
period. 
 The trends in financial mobility from the three sites are compelling.  They demonstrate, 
on the whole, a striking upward transition out of expenditures poverty.  In every study 
population, roughly half do not make any poverty transition over the two rounds; of these the 
vast majority are nonpoor households who remain nonpoor.  The other half of the population at 
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each site is generally escaping expenditures poverty.  In the MFI Study alone, 46.1 percent of the 
interviewed households reported being below the poverty line in 1994, and above it in 2007.  At 
the Ag Tech Study site, the poverty rate fell sharply from 53.5 percent in 1996 to a mere 12.3 
percent in 2007.  Even the FFE Study, which took place over a shorter, four-year timeframe, 
showed a growth in nonpoor households from 45.6 percent to 72.1 percent.  The upward trend is 
undeniable.  It is important to bear in mind that these transition matrices use the measure of 
expenditures and so are sensitive to stochastic fluctuations; nevertheless, the initial impression is 
that underlying forces may be driving this tremendous burst of expenditures growth present at 
each study site across the country. 
 The sources of this growth may be numerous, synergistically working to increase 
expenditures.  One source may be a change in asset holdings or an increasing access to credit.  
Other sources may be demographic in nature, such as an empowerment of women that permits 
them to have more control over household decisions including fertility and the freedom to earn 
an income outside the home.  Still others may be economic, whereby off-farm job opportunities 
become more abundant and easily accessed, permitting more people to leave subsistence 
agriculture. 
 Demographic and economic opportunities are summarized in Tables 4 and 5, which 
present key primary occupations reported by household heads and their spouses.  In the highly 
patriarchal society of rural Bangladesh, it is not uncommon for women to marry as adolescents 
or teenagers and forego any more formal schooling in favor of performing household duties and 
bearing and raising children (Field and Ambrus 2008).  It follows that household heads are 
nearly always male; only five percent of self-reported heads of household in this survey are 
women.  Thus Table 4 proxies—albeit not perfectly—for adult male occupations and Table 5 for 
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female occupations.  These tables indicate both how economic opportunities in general are 
changing and the ways that the balance of power is, gradually, shifting in Bangladeshi 
households between genders. 
 The primary occupation reported by household heads in the first round of surveys is 
agricultural in nature, including work on their own farm and raising livestock.  The transition 
away from this activity over the course of the interviews is nontrivial.  Most dramatic is the case 
of the MFI Study, where 54.3 percent of heads reported working in agriculture in 1994 but less 
than 20 percent did so in 2007.  The balance is made up by a swell of self-employment, the 
nature of which was not elucidated by respondents.  The fact that the self-employment category 
did not exist in 1994 is a notable indication that home-businesses became a popular and 
successful enterprise over the thirteen years between rounds.  Similar movements out of 
agriculture are noticeable in the other study sites, with an analogous transition to self-
employment in the FFE Study.  The large percentage of fish-related activities by the FFE 
households in the first round may be attributed to the southeastern thana of Chakaria, which 
borders the Bay of Bengal to the west. 
 Agriculture, while declining as a male activity, concomitantly became more popular as a 
female activity.  Representing the primary activity of only a small percentage household heads’ 
spouses in the first round, agriculture become their second-most common occupation by 2007.  
The transition is particularly profound in the MFI households, where agricultural work by 
spouses increased fourteen-fold by the second round.  A few spouses reported schoolwork as 
their primary occupation, but overwhelmingly they are engaged in household duties.  It is so 
common for women to fill this role in this sample that, in the 2007 survey, this occupation was 
labeled ―housewife‖ instead of the previous label ―household work‖.  Nevertheless, the decline 
36 
 
of household work as the primary occupation of spouses is a strong sign of the changing status of 
women.  This shift is largest in the MFI Study, where the fraction fell by nearly a quarter.  It may 
in fact be the case that the preference for women clients by MFIs has handed spouses new 
bargaining power and allowed them to exercise their right to work in agriculture, as the increase 
in agricultural occupations suggests.  The unequivocal occupational shift by household heads and 
their spouses suggests that as agriculture becomes less popular as a male activity, females are 
picking it up.  Thus it may be that households on the whole are not becoming less agricultural, 
but that men are moving out of it in favor of other, presumably higher-return, activities while 
women continue the previous work in agriculture.   
 Table 6 reports the changes of physical asset holdings as a proportion of the total, based 
on self-reported and imputed values.  An especially interesting agricultural trend, which may 
indicate a shift in agricultural practices, occurred in the FFE sites.  Over the four-year study, the 
value of landholdings decreased significantly while the value of livestock increased significantly 
by a similar magnitude.  Coincidentally, the FFE Study was the only site where spouses entered 
agriculture faster than household heads left it.  The Ag Tech Study experienced the only other 
significant agriculture-related shift; the average value of poultry declined by more than half, 
perhaps on account of the promotion of gardening and fishpond technologies in those sites.  
Tellingly, the only asset that showed universally significant growth for the three studies was 
jewelry, an asset typically controlled by women in South Asia (Antonopolous and Floro 2004).  
This increase further suggests that the empowerment of women and that general financial 
improvement are occurring all across rural Bangladesh.  Jewelry is an indicator of women’s 
status because they tend to maintain control over it, it is a highly liquid buffer asset that can be 
used to smooth consumption in the event of a shock, and it is a smart investment because it is 
37 
 
less prone to erosion by inflation than cash (White 1992).  This evidence suggests that the 
poverty transitions noted in the transition matrices may not be random, but rather based in 
economic progress and growing wealth. 
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CHAPTER 5:  METHODS 
5.1  Generating the Asset Index 
 Structural income is a function of a combination of assets, but building a reliable 
aggregate measure of total household assets in order to capture intertemporal dynamics is a 
nuanced process.  A one-dimensional measure of period-specific assets is the standard for 
observing household structural income over time.  In rural Bangladesh households rely on 
various kinds of assets for their productivity and wellbeing.  Attempts to summarize assets 
ownership in simple terms are necessarily problematic.  As Carter and Barrett (2006) confirm, 
pinpointing the asset levels that accurately reflect expenditures is one of the biggest challenges in 
studies of poverty traps. 
Sahn and Stifel (2003) argue that expenditures or consumption values may be distorted 
by a poor understanding of local markets and prices.  Concerned about the difficulties in 
measuring income and expenditures in developing countries, they propose the use of principal 
component analysis or factor analysis for an asset index.  These techniques have the advantage of 
estimating the weights on assets without requiring expenditure data; they rather assume that 
variability in asset holdings reflects the levels of a latent or unobserved wealth variable (Filmer 
and Pritchett 2001).  Yet principal component analysis is weakened by its assumption that all of 
the specified assets fully explain the variability of the model.  Moreover, these approaches lack 
the power to give a meaningful understanding of marginal effects and fail to account for 
nonlinearities in asset behavior. 
Instead, where expenditure data are available, Adato, Carter, and May (2006) suggest a 
livelihood-weighted asset index which will be used in this study.  They define livelihood as the 
quotient of household expenditures divided by a cost-of-basic-needs poverty line, or 
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 (1)     
   
  
 
where     is the expenditure of household   in time  , and    is the poverty line.  In this way the 
asset index is computed in poverty line units, or PLUs, where      gives the proportion of the 
inflation-adjusted poverty line at which a household consumes. 
 The index is then generated in a regression of the livelihood function on household 
assets.  In this way livelihood is expressed as a response to structural underpinnings of a 
household’s income rather than to random variation.  The estimation is 
(2)            
 
         
where      is household  ’s ownership of asset   in time  , and the coefficient    reflects the 
marginal returns to the asset.  Finally, the fitted values      generated from the regression 
represent the asset index.  The advantages to this method are numerous.  Because the 
household’s bundle of assets is used to predict livelihood in PLUs, the interpretation of the asset 
poverty line is straightforward: a household owning a bundle of assets that predicts a livelihood 
less than unity is in structural poverty.  The estimation procedure directly determines the weights 
of each asset in the overall livelihood of the household but, unlike principal component analysis, 
permits unobserved variation to remain in the stochastic error term.  Carter et al. (2007) point out 
that this estimation benefits from including the assets that influence expenditures, and from 
excluding shocks or other variables that would obscure accumulation patterns over time.  Wealth 
indicators such as materials used to build the home are also extraneous because they cloud the 
understanding of asset relevance to poverty.  The purpose of the index is not so much to 
determine marginal effects of asset ownership on livelihood, but to succinctly explain, by means 
of the fitted value, variation in expenditures solely in terms of asset levels. 
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 Given the theoretical importance of diminishing marginal returns to assets in the 
existence of poverty traps, and in consideration of the data availability in the Chronic Poverty 
and Long Term Impact surveys, equation (2) is adapted for this study and fitted as 
(3)                                     
     
     
     
             
where  is a vector of assets composed of the measures of capital for household   in time  : 
physical ( ), human ( ), social ( ), and natural ( );    is a vector of the same assets squared.  
The binary variable variable     represents the sex of the household head, which would not 
provide useful information if squared.  By using a quadratic form of each variable where 
applicable, these assets are modeled to allow increasing or diminishing marginal returns to 
productivity.  Most physical assets should, in theory, experience diminishing returns, meaning 
that the expected signs of the linear terms are positive and the expected signs of the squared 
terms are negative.  
 The index       may be estimated from pooled data in order to give the same weights to 
assets in all rounds, or the regression may be performed separately if the marginal returns to 
assets are assumed to vary over time.  Separate estimates may be desired if technological change 
is expected to influence marginal returns, but this decision requires estimation of multiple cross-
sections and sacrifices the statistical power of panel data methods that can otherwise be exploited 
with multiple observations through time. Three commonly applied panel data operations are 
pooled ordinary least squares (POLS), random effects, and fixed effects. 
 Panel data methods acknowledge that two distinct types of variation exist for the 
variables in longitudinal observations.  The ―within‖ variation is defined as the variation 
attributable to an individual over time.  The ―between‖ variation corresponds to variation across 
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individuals in the same time period.  Cameron and Trivedi (2009) assign the pooled OLS 
estimation as 
(4)           
      
where time trends are included in the vector of regressors.  Problematically, the error term     
may be correlated for an individual over time (within) or across individuals (between).    If the 
regressors are correlated with the error term, estimates of individual effects will be inconsistent.  
Because fixed effects and random effects analyze the within and between variations differently, 
they are candidates to substitute for the potentially inconsistent POLS estimator.  The random 
effects estimator assumes that each error term     is independent and identically distributed, and 
allows the error to be serially correlated (ibid.).  In contrast, the fixed effects estimator assumes 
that a time-invariant component of the error term            is correlated to the regressors.  
The model estimates deviations from means and in the process differences out the fixed effects, 
thus eliminating time-invariant heterogeneity.  Fixed effects models have the advantage of 
controlling for endogeneity, but they sacrifice the ability to estimate coefficients of variables that 
remain constant within an observation across time, such as spatial variables.  Furthermore, less-
efficient estimates are obtained if fixed unobservables are not correlated with regressors.  
However, if fixed effects are more appropriate, then random effects estimates will be 
inconsistent (Angrist and Pischke 2009).  A Hausman test statistically compares the estimators, 
under the null hypothesis of random individual effects, to determine whether the within 
component of overall variation is more important than the between component.  If individual 
effects are determined to be nonrandom, the fixed effects model should be used. 
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5.2  Nonparametric Plotting of Asset Dynamics 
 With the predicted values       generated for two or more rounds of data, the asset index 
may be used to study the pattern of asset dynamics over time.  Plotting assets against lagged 
assets is one way to visualize this information, but inference about the expected asset trends of a 
given household requires teasing that trend from the data.  Parametric and semi-parametric 
methods would inappropriately impose a structure to the data, potentially ignoring valuable 
subtleties that define patterns of asset ownership.  Rather, accumulation trajectories may be 
estimated from the bivariate relationship of assets and lagged assets via a flexible, non-
parametric estimator. 
 Developed by Cleveland (1979), the robust locally weighted scatterplot smoother 
(abbreviated ―lowess‖) can estimate local polynomial regressions according to a number of user-
defined parameters.  These results are convenient to display in a graphical manner as a series of 
smoothed lines that string together the fitted values.  The lowess estimator is flexible and 
nonparametric in that it allows the data—not a predefined functional form—to shape the 
estimation.  Lowess is locally weighted because, for each observation   , it generates a fitted 
value    based on a first-degree polynomial weighted least squares regression of other 
observations within a given radius.  Each residual       then determines a new set of weights 
for a subsequent regression for the same   , with small weights given to large residuals and large 
weights to small residuals.  This process is repeated several times for each   .  A kernel 
bandwidth is implemented for the weighting, and commonly lowess is performed with a variable 
bandwidth using a specified percentage of observations around each    rather than a constant 
distance. 
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One particular strength of the lowess estimator is the series of successive residual-
weighted regressions run for each observation, which makes the procedure robust to outliers and 
sensitive to patterns or trends around core groups of data points.  The researcher may also 
influence the curvature of the result by specifying a different bandwidth; larger bandwidths 
extend the radius of local regressions in order to account for more distant data points, a method 
that reduces the emphasis on nearby points and results in a ―flatter‖ curve.  One of the limitations 
of the estimator is that lowess implicitly assumes that the expected two-dimensional relationship 
among observations is a continuous function, but this is a reasonable assumption for the patterns 
of household asset growth. 
After estimating the two-period bivariate asset index, the lowess smoother is 
implemented to predict the dynamics of asset accumulation.  In the presence of a Micawber 
Threshold or multiple stable equilibria, the lowess fitted values will take the form of the S-
shaped regime in Figure 2.  However, any number of trajectories is possible and the form 
depends on local accumulation strategies, household preferences, presence of social safety nets, 
and development initiatives.  Whether assets bifurcate or converge and at what point they do so 
will be ascertained by applying this technique to the study households. 
 
5.3  Impact of Microfinance in a Household Growth Model 
As previously discussed, microfinance has tremendous potential to influence a 
household’s structural wealth.  Credit unfetters a household’s growth potential and provides the 
capital for immediate purchases of productive assets which would otherwise be beyond a 
household’s purchasing power in an autarchic savings strategy.  However, a rigorous evaluation 
of the impact of microfinance on welfare is one of the most strenuous exercises in developmental 
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economics, as substantiated by the wide range of sometimes conflicting conclusions presented in 
extant studies.  The stringent data requirements of these evaluations necessitate careful survey 
design and timing.  A baseline survey of villages prior to the introduction of microfinance, 
though not strictly necessary, permits the comparison of village and individual characteristics to 
test whether the participant population is significantly different from the non-participant 
population.  Commonly MFIs will introduce branches purposively—that is, based on some 
observable feature, such as number of people in a village in extreme poverty—and so treatment 
areas will differ systematically from control areas.  In addition, the individual-level participation 
choice within the villages that have credit access further confounds attempts at estimating clean, 
unbiased results from the data.  This freedom of decision makes participation variables 
potentially endogenous.  It is conceivable that an unobservable characteristic in the error term, 
such as entrepreneurial skill, influences both the decision to participate in microfinance and the 
outcome of interest, such as expenditures.  If true, this endogeneity would bias estimates of 
microfinance participation upward. 
Several elegant statistical techniques allow the circumvention of these problems, most 
commonly difference-in-differences, propensity score matching, and instrumental variables 
(Khandker, Koolwal, and Samad 2010).  However, only one of three sites in this study collected 
data with the specific intention of evaluating microfinance activities, and no study site offers a 
pre-intervention survey due to the widespread prevalence of MFIs in Bangladesh at the time the 
surveys were first deployed.  In order to derive a uniform, comparable analysis across the three 
survey sites, the standard microfinance evaluation tools are not applied due to the limited data 
availability regarding the use of savings and credit.  Additionally, the tremendous time difference 
between survey rounds, while useful to the analysis of poverty traps, does not lend itself well to 
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traditional microfinance evaluation methods.  All three sites, however, do gather data on the 
presence of MFIs in each village where surveys were conducted, which may be exploited as an 
indicator of access to MFI services. 
 The proposed framework does not categorize a household as a microfinance participant in 
a binary sense; rather, the duration of microfinance activity within a village conveys the 
experience of both the organization and the villagers.  The estimation is a household-level 
growth model given as the ordinary least squares regression 
(5)                                                                          
where 
    is the change in livelihood between two rounds (       ), 
   is a vector of baseline productive assets as in the asset index, 
     is a vector of positive and negative shocks in one of two intervals  , 
       is baseline expenditures, 
            is the number of years household   has had access to MFI services, and 
    is the stochastic error term. 
While it is desirable to use      , the change in asset index, as the dependent variable in equation 
(5), the asset index is itself the predicted values of a prior regression and as such already a 
function of assets and a stochastic error term.  To use this variable as the regressand would 
introduce further uncertainty in the measurements.  However, to the extent that changes in 
livelihood reflect structural transitions,     would be an appropriate outcome on the left hand 
side. 
 The household-level growth model is inspired in part by Romer’s (1986) endogenous 
growth theory.  The autarchic accumulation regime posited by asset dynamics theory suggests 
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that growth in income is a function of endogenous (rather than external) factors, in this case the 
ownership of assets in the initial round of surveys.  Household livelihood growth is partly 
determined by the initial levels of the factors of production available to a household, including 
physical, human, social, and natural capital, whose marginal returns cause an expansion or 
contraction in household welfare.  The growth model is then modified to accommodate 
idiosyncratic and covariate shocks which can reverse growth by forcing a coping behavior, or 
accelerate growth through access to microfinance services which provide alternate coping 
mechanisms that do not consume a household’s livelihood.  The linear-logarithmic specification 
captures diminishing returns to assets while consolidating the model to allow for the addition of 
shock measures.  The logarithmic transformation is applied also to years of microfinance access 
in light of Menon’s (2006) findings that households with longer exposure to microfinance exhibit 
lower variability in income changes; thus years of access to credit also appear to have 
diminishing returns to individual households’ change in livelihood. 
 A valid measure of the impact of microfinance requires an exogenous regressor.  The 
hunt for this elusive variable has typically led researchers to use an indicator of household 
eligibility, village-level presence of MFIs, or an interaction of the two.  Eligibility rules, 
considered exogenous to individual households, are almost always based on landholdings, which 
are (often) easily observed and verifiable.  But most MFIs with a landholdings criterion do not 
adhere strictly to this eligibility cutoff; rather, the rules are often bent to accommodate more 
borrowers, in many cases because wealthier clients with more land are a less risky investment for 
the bank or simply because wealthier households may be able to bribe their way into the system 
(Khandker 2005; de Aghion and Morduch 2005). 
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 Because eligibility suffers from a lack of rigid enforcement and MFI access is 
increasingly prevalent in Bangladesh, the chosen measure is the number of years a household has 
had access to a microfinance institution in the village.  In one sense it is an indicator of village-
level presence of MFIs, but has the advantage of capturing the steady growth of MFI services 
withing a village and the time required for an MFI to build a foundation of trust in a community 
where pro-women initiatives are often met with skepticism or distrust by men.  Kaboski and 
Townsend (2005) use presence of an institution as an instrumental variable for MFI membership 
in their analysis, but acknowledge that if the MFIs have externalities with respect to 
nonmembers’ welfare, their results may be biased.  They concede that a variable for the MFI 
presence in the outcome equation is a good measure of the average impacts of microfinance.  For 
simplicity it is assumed here that the presence of just one MFI in any given village will induce 
those households that feel credit-constrained to borrow in order to continue to accumulate assets.  
It may be the case that, where multiple MFIs exist in the same village, their impact is somehow 
additive; similarly it may be that in larger villages the capacity to serve households is diluted 
when compared to the same organization in a smaller village.  Such behaviors are difficult to 
quantify, however; the primary model will favor a simple measure of the length of time any MFI 
has been working in a village, a conservative approach designed to capture the minimum effect 
of MFI presence. 
Quisumbing and Baulch (2009) point out that, in the various rounds of the MFI Study 
conducted in 1994, microfinance treatment and control groups were selected so that single-
differencing would provide program impact estimates.   The same technique does not guarantee 
unbiased estimates of program impact over the thirteen years between the original surveys and 
the 2007 follow-up.  The notion that control groups will remain uncontaminated and fully 
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comparable with treatment groups over such a long time period in a country of such active MFI 
growth is improbable.  The model seeks instead to establish an intent-to-treat effect of the 
duration of MFI access on household livelihood growth.  Further analysis of this variable and 
justifications for its inclusion may be found in the next section. 
 
5.4  Definition of Variables 
5.4.1  Valuation of Productive Assets 
 One of the challenges of the asset index estimation is to choose the appropriate assets to 
explain variation in expenditures and, in particular, the way in which such assets will be 
quantified.  As previously described, the ideal asset index regressors will only be factors that 
may be considered productive in the sense that they contribute to a household’s autarchic 
accumulation strategy.  These assets can be categorized under the familiar umbrellas of physical, 
human, social, and natural capital. 
 Physical capital is the most direct means of income generation in rural farming 
households.  It encompasses the animals, tools, and land upon which a farmer relies to grow 
crops for consumption or sale.  Whenever possible, this study monetizes assets based on reported 
values.  Using values instead of quantities serves several functions.  First, it reduces the number 
of variables required for estimation and liberates degrees of freedom.  Second, it provides a 
straightforward way to aggregate assets into different categories to estimate their impact as a 
group.  Third, it captures heterogeneity in the usefulness of particular tools or animals by 
allowing the owner to indicate their worth.  Fourth, it inherently captures quality of the asset 
based on the reported value.  As an example of this point, a farmer may own two acres of fertile 
land and twenty of uncultivable marsh, which totals more land area but lower land value than 
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that of a farmer who owns ten acres of arable land.  It is clear how value would be more useful as 
an indicator of productive capacity than quantity of acres.  Fifth, as assets deteriorate, their value 
declines with it; owner-reported values are likely to account for the unobserved condition of an 
asset.  Sixth, knowledge of markets also allows a responder to make a judgment of worth based 
on particular local conditions. 
When self-reported values are not available, they are imputed based on transaction prices.  
This procedure was performed for livestock and poultry values in the first round of the MFI 
Study and Ag Tech Study.  For each type of animal owned by a household in the base round, the 
owner reported whether any animals were purchased or sold in the previous month, and the price 
paid.  These prices were averaged for all transactions by animal in all thanas during that year.  
When thana-specific average prices differed significantly (=0.05) from the overall average, the 
thana-specific price was imputed for that animal in its corresponding thana.  When the prices did 
not differ significantly, the overall average was imputed instead. 
 
5.4.2  Defining the Asset Index Variables 
 The dependent variable of the asset index estimation is the livelihood function, defined 
above as the ratio of a household’s monthly per capita expenditures divided by the poverty line.  
In this case the poverty line is a cost-of-basic-needs measure including the expenses for food and 
non-food consumption required to maintain a subsistence living.  In addition to framing the asset 
index in terms of poverty line units, this livelihood function has several advantages.  First, the 
data provided thana-specific poverty lines for each study site and round, permitting a higher 
resolution of poverty measurement that is more consistent with the heterogeneous experience in 
separate geographical regions.   Second, the livelihood index is a normalized measure of welfare 
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that reduces the variance around the mean of the regressand.  Most importantly, the poverty lines 
for both the base and follow-up survey rounds are appropriately deflated by the consumer price 
index to give a consistent measure of welfare for both the base and follow-up survey rounds.  
Once the poverty line is deflated, the asset index is comparable across rounds without further 
adjustment to values of productive assets. 
 It may be argued that current-period assets are not an appropriate predictor of current-
period livelihood due to a necessary lag between the capital inputs into production and the 
realized gains from that production.  It is true that the ideal asset index would be estimated using 
a measure of previous-period assets as the predictors of current livelihood; many assets, 
particularly physical capital such as agricultural equipment, carry an inherent delay between use 
and potential profit.  However, current assets are a reasonable predictor of current consumption, 
and are certainly a much better proxy than assets that are lagged over thirteen or eleven years as 
would be the case in the MFI or Ag Tech Study.  Furthermore, because this study is interested in 
long-term asset accumulation and the data set provides only two periods for such an analysis, 
using current-period assets as predictors of current-period consumption allows the use of panel 
data methods. 
 The high proportion of households engaged in agricultural work in the sample requires 
the independent variables in the asset index estimation be defined largely in terms of animals, 
land, and tools.  Animal ownership is divided into the two distinct categories of livestock and 
poultry.  Livestock consists of goats, sheep, bullocks, and dairy cows; poultry is defined as 
chickens, ducks, and geese.  Table 7 shows that average ownership of these animals in the base 
round is fairly modest, with no household exceeding 15 head of livestock.  Poultry, being less 
costly and requiring less land to raise and manage compared to livestock, has a higher average 
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ownership rate.  Nevertheless, 17.2 percent of all households did not own any poultry while 44.0 
percent did not own any livestock in the first round. 
  Land is the second physical asset of interest in the asset index.  The household surveys 
generally divide land into the categories of homestead, cultivable land, pond, and other land.  
Because these definitions are fairly coarse and uninformative, the reported value of the land 
becomes even more important to the analysis.  Fertile land will tend to have a high value and 
also a high productivity for the owner.  Unproductive land will not be valued highly.  In villages 
with fishpond technology, the ownership of a pond may contribute substantially more to a 
household’s utility and so take on a higher value.  Because the surveys did not present a good 
alternative measure of natural capital, the land value variable also doubles as a proxy for natural 
capital at the household’s disposal.  
 The final category of physical assets is productive equipment.  This broad category 
encompasses both farming and household assets that may be useful in generating an income.  
Equipment includes hoes and ploughs, husking machines, tillers, fishing nets, boats, irrigation 
pumps, oil processors, vehicles, rickshaws, sewing machines, pushcarts, metal pots and pans, 
stoves, refrigerators, wells, irons, and in later rounds, mobile phones.  These assets have 
functionality in farming, small businesses, and home enterprises.  In the Ag Tech Study, 
rickshaw pullers were fairly common in both rounds of interviews.  Self employment was also on 
the rise over the survey rounds, and it is conceivable that husking, oil processing, sewing, and 
other home-based activities accounted for this increase.  
  The productive capacity of physical assets is meaningless without human capital to 
implement it.  An ideal study would include the number of working age household members and 
the number of dependent members (either too young or too old to work).  However the 
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incomplete age data in all three studies precluded the construction of a dependency variable.  As 
a necessary (albeit inferior) proxy the total number of household members was used as a human 
capital measure instead.  The age and education of the household head were also included.  The 
number of years of schooling of the household head was quite low in most households, often 
being surpassed by the head’s children.  While it is tempting to use a different measure such as 
the highest education attained in the household or the combined education of the head and 
spouse, the strong patriarchal nature of Bangladeshi households suggests that the education of 
the head alone would be a more accurate identifier of the educational basis to household 
decision-making. 
 The final component of productivity, social capital, is also the most difficult to quantify.  
The surveys lacked a wide selection of potential network variables that would represent a 
household’s social status or connections within a village.  Whether the household head is a male 
is, to an extent, a component of social capital in rural Bangladesh where men are likely to have 
more freedom than women to leave the house and engage in social activities.  The proportion of 
male heads is greatest in the MFI Study, almost reaching 100 percent, but the Ag Tech Study 
shows a decline in the proportion of male heads by 7.5 percentage points from 1996 to 2007.  
The sex of the household head may also have implications for the availability of resources and 
agricultural productivity (Udry 1996).  The most reliable network variable, however, was 
collected in both periods only for the MFI Study.  The survey asked both the head and his or her 
spouse for the distance to the village where their parents were raised.  This variable indicates 
how established a household is in the local community; living close to parents means that the 
head and spouse of a household have a broader, more accessible support network, and are likely 
to have more connections to friends and neighbors.  In one sense, neighbors can act as a sort of 
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―buffer asset‖ against idiosyncratic shocks by being a source of short-term borrowing or by 
providing services when a household is in need (Collins et al. 2009).  The parents’ village 
distance variables are unavailable in the Ag Tech or FFE Studies and are omitted from the asset 
index in those sites. 
 Summary statistics for the variables used in the asset index estimation are reported in 
Tables 8, 9, and 10.  The most obvious trend is the nearly universal increase in the combined real 
reported values of all physical asset holdings.  After adjusting for inflation, the average value of 
most assets rose in the second round, in some cases quite substantially.  Jewelry made a notable 
jump in two sites, increasing more than four-fold in value in the Ag Tech Study.  This spike is 
further evidence for the increasing status of women and the greater overall wealth of the 
households on average.  Average land value also climbed considerably in the MFI and Ag Tech 
Studies, but curiously declined in the FFE Study.  This decline corresponds to a decrease in the 
land value as a share of total asset value noted in Table 6.  These households may, on average, be 
changing their agricultural strategy from crops to intensified grazing and livestock rearing.  
Although not verified empirically, this change may be the preference of women in agriculture, 
given that spouses are assuming the agricultural role rapidly in the FFE site. 
 Household size averaged five to six people in the base surveys and showed modest 
growth over the course of the study.  The highest rate of household growth occurred in the FFE 
site, where the number of household members increased by an average of 1.8 over just four 
years. In all three studies, the average age of household heads ranges from 43 to 50, but the 
variation in ages is enormous, from a minimum of 14 years in the MFI Study to a maximum of 
96 years in the FFE Study.  In fact, in the FFE Study the average age of the household head 
declines slightly even though intuition suggests that average age should increase over time.  The 
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likely explanation is that older household heads pass away and their younger heirs assume the 
headship.  The average education level of household heads, measured in completed years of 
schooling, shows a modest increase in all three study sites, most likely because a younger and 
slightly more educated generation assumes the headship of households over time. 
 
5.4.3  Defining the Household Growth Model Variables 
 The dependent variable of the household growth model is chosen to be the change in 
livelihood calculated as the difference of livelihood in round one from that in round two.  The 
livelihood variable is also the regressand in the asset index estimation.  Although livelihood is 
used again, the ideal dependent variable to measure what impacts asset growth is the asset index 
itself.  However, the index is the fitted values of the regression of livelihood on assets, and as 
such is subject to its own measurement error.  To use such a variable as the regressand would 
complicate the estimation and potentially add a bias in an unknown direction to the estimated 
coefficients of the new regression.  Additionally, the fitted values are estimated using levels of 
assets as regressors; the growth model also includes the base values of many of the same assets.  
The relationship between the asset index and the assets themselves would further complicate the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  Thus the change in livelihood 
will be used as a proxy for change in assets conditional on verification that livelihood changes 
are structural and driven by assets. 
Table 11 provides the summary statistics for the variables included in the household 
growth model that were not also included in the asset index.  While the MFI access variable and 
the base expenditures variable are transformed into natural logarithms in the model estimation, 
they are presented in their untransformed state for the sake of interpretation.  The data suggest 
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that households across all sites are, on average, increasing their livelihood at an astonishing rate.  
In just eleven years in the Ag Tech Study, household average livelihood rose by 0.79 PLUs.  In a 
few cases, households that increased their livelihood did so five- or six-fold.  The largest growth 
occurred in the Ag Tech Study, where the maximum change in livelihood was 6.3 PLUs.  
However, not all household grew during the course of the survey.  Each study also saw the 
expenditures of a few households slip.  The largest fall occurred in the FFE Study, where one 
household’s change in livelihood was reported as -2.36 PLUs.  Consistent with the average 
growth in livelihood, there is also a slow growth in average base expenditures between the three 
studies.  Base expenditures in the Ag Tech Study and FFE Study were measured in 1996 and 
2003, respectively, and were consecutively higher over time, lending further evidence to the idea 
that wealth is increasing in rural Bangladesh. 
 The dependent variable is a stochastic measure of wealth that may be impacted in large 
part by positive or negative shocks, both idiosyncratic (unique to a household) or covariate 
(experienced by many households in a village).  An example of a negative idiosyncratic shock is 
a theft of livestock or savings; a covariate shock may be a broad agricultural condition such as a 
drought.  Covariate shocks are usually experienced in the negative sense, but idiosyncratic events 
may infuse a household with unexpected capital.   ―Positive‖ shocks refer to any potentially 
beneficial event or any inflow of money; ―negative‖ shocks refer to any setbacks or considerable 
losses of money.  Following Quisumbing and Baulch (2009), shocks are divided into several 
categories and two distinct time periods.  A ―life‖ shock is an idiosyncratic non-monetized event, 
or an event with an assigned transfer value that corresponds to major life events.  A household 
may also experience an idiosyncratic ―business‖ shock; here business is defined as income-
generating activities or opportunities to increase capital stocks (including human capital).  See 
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Table 12 for a list of the events included in each category.  Covariate shocks are reported in 
community surveys administered to a village representative.  In this study, a covariate shock is 
defined as any commonly occurring natural disaster that affects many households within a 
village and includes cyclones, floods, and droughts. 
 Shocks were distributed among two time periods for the MFI Study and Ag Tech Study.  
Because follow-up surveys in 2007 asked for a recall of shocks occurring since 1996, more 
distant shocks (1996-2001) were separated from more recent shocks (2002-2007) as a way to 
determine whether shocks persistently affect expenditures on a longer time scale, or whether 
recent shocks are more likely to impact welfare.  In the FFE Study, however, only a single shock 
interval (2003-2007) was used because of the shorter duration between rounds.  All shocks are 
recorded as a binary variable, being equal to one if a household or village experienced the given 
shock in the given interval, and zero otherwise; thus the summary statistics in Table 11 reflect 
the proportion of respondents experiencing the given shock.  As two particularly large floods 
occurred in 1998 and 2004, respectively, the dividing of shocks into two periods should also 
provide an indication of whether these covariate events affected households in both the short- 
and long-term.  Several of the MFI Study thanas are situated near the Jamuna and Ganges rivers, 
making them especially susceptible to flooding during heavy rains. 
The mean values of shocks indicate that, on the whole, negative shocks are reported with 
higher frequency than positive shocks.  This may be due to the fact that positive shocks simply 
occur less often than negative shocks; this discrepancy may also reflect a reporting bias if 
negative shocks leave a more lasting impression on the respondent’s memory or are larger in 
magnitude.  Only 6.1 percent of households in the MFI Study reported a positive life shock 
between the years 1996 and 2001, while the incidence of a negative life shock were 33.8 percent 
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in the same households during the same time period.  Both positive and negative business 
shocks, however, showed similar average frequency for households in the MFI Study and Ag 
Tech Study in the second interval. 
 The final component of the household growth model is the variable for years of access to 
microfinance services at the village level.  The 2007 community surveys asked each village 
representative about the microfinance organizations working in the villages and the year in 
which they began operation.  The four reported MFIs working in the survey villages were 
Grameen Bank, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (later known simply as BRAC), 
Association for Social Advancement (ASA), and Proshika.  Proshika was the least common MFI 
to be reported as active in the study samples, and Grameen Bank was generally the most 
common, being the oldest and most well-established institution in the country.  The average 
duration of MFI access in the villages ranged from about 16 years in the FFE Study to over 20 
years in the MFI Study.  The largest range of MFI availability, though, is observed in the Ag 
Tech Study, where in 2007 some villages had access to MFIs for 30 years while one village had 
not been reached by any institution at all. 
 One concern of the MFI access variable in estimating its impact on livelihood changes is 
its collinearity with other asset values.  If duration of access to credit directly increases asset 
holdings, and asset holdings directly determine changes in livelihood, then this strong 
relationship between credit and assets clouds the inference of the impact of MFIs on household 
growth.  In addition, the potential for purposive microfinance program placement implies that 
MFIs are likely to be established longer in villages with lower levels of observable assets, 
suggesting that the MFI duration variable will be strongly and negatively correlated to asset 
holdings.  Table 13 explores the correlation coefficients between years of MFI access and value 
58 
 
of assets in order to verify any trends that may reveal a selection problem.  The general 
relationship between MFI access and assets appears extremely weak.  The strongest correlations 
appear with poultry in the MFI Study at 0.18, and with land in the Ag Tech Study at -0.21.  The 
latter, although potentially indicative of an MFI placement selection based on landholdings, is 
not large enough in magnitude to arouse serious suspicion.  Although these small correlations are 
not conclusive proof that MFI access is completely exogenous, they make a case for the validity 
of the variable’s inclusion in the growth model estimation. 
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CHAPTER 6:  RESULTS 
6.1  Selection of the Asset Index Estimator 
 Before estimating the asset index model with longitudinal data, an appropriate estimator 
must be selected from among pooled ordinary least squares, random effects, and fixed effects.  It 
would seem fitting, based on theory alone, to choose the fixed effects estimator over other panel 
data tools.  POLS is the most vulnerable to biased estimates based on within and between 
correlation of the error term.  The random effects estimator, while controlling for between 
correlation, fails to correct for unobserved endogeneity and requires the more strict assumption 
that the time-invariant component of the error term is distributed independently of the regressors.  
The estimates are consistent only if this assumption holds.  The fixed effects estimator, however, 
differences out this portion of the error term and produces consistent estimates.  This feature is 
particularly desirable in the estimation of the asset index, where unmeasurable household traits 
such as willingness to make risky investments may be correlated with both the level of assets in 
the regressors and the livelihood function. 
After estimating the fixed effects and random effects model, the Hausman test was 
applied.  In all three study sites, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the difference 
in the coefficients is not systematic, and favors the fixed effects estimator for the asset index.
3
  
Panel fixed effects are therefore used to estimate the asset index, although at the expense of 
controlling for spatial heterogeneity across thanas.  Robust standard errors are used because the 
error term may be heteroscedastic in the asset model; for example, an expenditures-poor 
household is unlikely to own a large number of poultry, while a nonpoor household may be 
equally likely to own many chickens or none at all.  Thus the variance of the error term is likely 
                                                          
3
 In the MFI Study,        = 26.81 with a p-value of 0.0028; in the Ag Tech study,       = 61.84 with a p-value of 
0.0000; in the FFE Study,       = 17.31 with a p-value of 0.0440. 
60 
 
to be nonconstant, and heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors will 
yield correct significance levels.  Although the results of the fixed effects models are used in this 
analysis, the estimates obtained from the three candidate methods are quite similar.  These are 
not discussed here, but a comparison of the fixed effects, random effects, and POLS estimators 
for all three studies can be found in the appendix (Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3). 
 
6.2  Results of Fixed Effects Estimations 
The results of the fixed effects estimation for the MFI, Ag Tech, and FFE Studies are 
presented in Table 14.  The number of observations varies by site; with over 1,600 observations, 
the Ag Tech Study estimation has the most statistical power of the three and correspondingly has 
a larger number of significant results.  The panel data estimation is robust to the unbalanced 
panels of the MFI and Ag Tech Studies, where the number of households in the first round 
exceeds the number in the second round due to attrition.  At first glance the results reveal that 
many of the coefficients have exceedingly small magnitudes, with some squared terms on the 
order of 10
-14
.  These numbers are deceiving, however; recall that the dependent variable 
(livelihood) is household expenditures scaled by the poverty line.  The poverty line varies by site 
but is on the order of hundreds of taka per person per month.  Recall also that physical assets are 
measured not by the number owned but by the value owned; thus in the Ag Tech Study, an 
increase in one taka worth of livestock increases expected livelihood by about 4x10
-6
.  Of course, 
a household cannot own just one taka of livestock—instead they might own an entire cow, whose 
average value across all Ag Tech households was reported as 4,347 taka.  In expectation, then, an 
increase in one cow should improve livelihood by 0.012 (=4,347 * 4x10
-6
), or by 1.2 percent of 
the poverty line. 
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Two common threads wound through the results of all three studies.  First, household 
size, a rough measure of human capital, has a negative and significant effect on livelihood.  The 
sign of this coefficient indicates that household size is a poor substitute for a measure of 
household labor supply.  Without useable age data, one cannot know whether the majority of the 
household consists of working-age or dependent members.  An increasing number of household 
members without a commensurate rise in expenditures would suggest a declining livelihood for 
each additional member.  The squared term is positive in the Ag Tech and FFE sites, indicating 
that the household size effect on livelihood is convex with a minimum at roughly 20 and 40 
household members respectively.  The second trend in the three study sites is a large and highly 
significant increase in livelihood over time.  For many households, time may be the best asset 
that works in their favor.  Here is statistical evidence that verifies the trends observed in the 
summary statistics: over the course of the two rounds, expected expenditures per capita 
skyrocketed, as much as 0.82 PLUs in the Ag Tech Study.  Such a large effect of the time trend, 
however, may indicate that the round variable obscures, to a certain degree, the accumulation 
behavior of assets; this possibility is further explored at the end of this section. 
Two other trends common to the three study sites stand out for a different reason: neither 
equipment nor the sex of the household head influenced expected livelihood.  The heavy focus 
on agricultural activities as the primary household occupation suggests that equipment—which 
includes farming tools, irrigation wells, and fishing nets—should be indispensible in securing an 
income which would translate into greater livelihood.  However, the equipment variable also 
combines household production assets such as sewing machines and stoves with assets like 
rickshaws and batteries.  The results of this variable may be different if it were disaggregated and 
more intentionally separated into distinct equipment categories. 
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The MFI Study is the only site to show significant effects of poultry ownership, which 
includes chickens, ducks, and geese.  Though the effect of poultry on livelihood is negative, the 
positive squared term indicates a convex shape that has a minimum at 75 taka (=0.0004 / 
[2*2.66x10
-6
]).  In the MFI Study an average chicken was worth just under 42 taka, so poultry 
has negative expected returns until the second bird is acquired, at which point it begins 
exhibiting increasing returns on average.  Jewelry and land are both positively associated with 
livelihood, and exhibit diminishing marginal returns with a negative sign on the squared term, 
consistent with microeconomic theory.  Surprisingly, despite the importance of land for expected 
livelihood, neither livestock nor productive equipment had a significant effect.  One possible 
explanation is that households in the MFI Study primarily used their land for poultry rather than 
for livestock or farming, although the average count of animals from Table 7 shows these 
households owned the least quantity of birds of any in the survey.  It is interesting to note that the 
primary social capital variables, distance to the villages of the parents of the household head and 
spouse, do not provide any substantial contribution to household welfare.  Contrary to the 
findings of Collins et al. (2009), networks of friends and family (at least in this study site) do not 
appear to significantly affect expenditures, or their effects have not been sufficiently measured. 
Similar to the results of the MFI Study, the households of the Ag Tech Study benefit 
from the ownership of jewelry and land, at a decreasing rate.  Unlike the MFI Study, for these 
households an increase in livestock provides a corresponding expected increase in livelihood, 
ceteris paribus.  The same households also own more livestock and poultry on average than the 
households in the other sites.  The coefficients on livestock and squared livestock imply 
increasing returns until the value reaches approximately 114,000 taka, which translates to the 
value of just over twelve cattle on average.  Interestingly, the maximum number of livestock 
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observed in any household is fifteen, hinting that households may be fully aware of the 
limitations of their returns on their animals. 
The Ag Tech households are the only ones to show significant returns to a household 
head’s education.  As theory would suggest, expected livelihood increases dramatically with 
each additional year of education.  The benefits of education show diminishing marginal returns 
and peak at 8.5 years.  Most household heads, however, never achieve such a high grade level.  
The average education level of household heads in the Ag Tech Study is just over three years 
with 78 percent obtaining an education level less than eight years, and fully 51 percent receiving 
no education at all. 
 The coefficients of the FFE Study contain the fewest significant results.  Curiously, the 
effects of the age of the household head in the Ag Tech Study and FFE Study have similar 
magnitude but opposite direction.  The weakly significant coefficient in the Ag Tech households 
reveals that expected expenditures increase with increasing age of the household head, while the 
age coefficient in the FFE Study indicates a decline in expenditures with increasing age of the 
head.  It is perhaps the case that in the Ag Tech households, whose livelihood is heavily 
influenced by livestock and land—both agricultural assets—age is also a measure of acquired 
skill or knowledge of agricultural practices that influence productivity.  The overall lack of 
significance of the FFE Study coefficients may be indicative of the slow pace of asset 
accumulation in rural Bangladesh.  The four years between the base and follow-up surveys may 
not be enough time to resolve the effects of the individual assets in a statistical sense. 
 As previously described, one of the limitations of fixed effects in the asset index 
estimation is the assumption that the asset contribution to livelihood remains constant through 
time.  Monetizing physical assets makes them susceptible to changes in relative prices, which are 
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not accounted for in the model.  Including the binary variable for the second round may be a way 
to capture some of this change in an imperfect way.  Each study site showed a large, positive, 
and strongly significant effect of the binary variable for the second round.  However, it may also 
be argued that asset accumulation is correlated across time due to the use of fixed effects.  Some 
of the variation in livelihood may be mistakenly attributed to an unexplained time trend rather 
than to asset growth.  For transparency, Table 15 compares the fixed effects model that includes 
the time trend with the same model that excludes the time variable.  Most of the results show 
stability in their magnitudes and significance levels.  A few variables alter their behavior; for 
example, education of the household head in the MFI Study and livestock ownership in the FFE 
Study exhibit positive (and concave) effects on livelihood when the round variable is omitted.  
At the same time, the effect of poultry in the MFI Study and household size in the FFE Study 
evaporate when the round variable is dropped.  While theories may argue both for the inclusion 
and exclusion of the time trend variable, the change affects few interpretations while leaving the 
bulk of the results largely unfazed.  
 
6.3  Asset Dynamics in Rural Bangladesh 
 Recall that the asset index, or the fitted values of the fixed effects estimation of livelihood 
on assets, is the aggregated measure of structural factors that explain expenditures relative to the 
poverty line.  Before the estimated asset dynamics trajectory is presented, a more general 
consideration of the nature of asset poverty among the sample households is provided in Figure 
4.  For each study site, the household asset index is plotted for the first round (horizontal axis) 
and the second round (vertical axis) and each period’s asset poverty line is projected from the 
axis.  Household position relative to the asset poverty lines reveals a household’s asset poverty 
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status by round.  By visual inspection alone the structural shift over time is immediately evident.  
In all three studies a remarkably small number of households remains in asset poverty in both 
rounds.  Even fewer fall into asset poverty between rounds.  More than half in each study are 
consistently asset nonpoor.  Most important, however, are the households that began in asset 
poverty and were asset nonpoor by 2007.  This substantial movement out of the ranks of poverty 
already suggests that locally increasing returns to scale do not imply poverty traps for the 
households under study. 
 Figure 5 plots the dynamic asset accumulation trajectory by study site.
4
  The equilibrium 
line is included as a reference to the point at which the asset index remains static over time.  
These graphs plot the same household observations as in Figure 4, but include the lowess 
smoother of expected asset dynamics.  The top five percent of observations, where lowess has 
little statistical power and extreme points generate misleading trends, was trimmed for clarity.  
For each plot, the lowess bandwidth was selected as 0.2 (or 20 percent of all observations), in 
order to exaggerate slightly the trends in the data for illustrative purposes.  Larger bandwidths, 
while smoothing peaks and valleys of the plots, do not alter the interpretation of the results in 
this case. 
 The plots confirm econometrically
5
 what prior evidence suggested: structural growth—
that is, asset accumulation—is an underlying force propelling households out of poverty.  Asset-
                                                          
4
 See Figures A.1, A.2, and A.3 in the appendix to compare the lowess plot of the fixed effects estimator with that of 
the random effects and pooled ordinary least squares estimators.  The results are largely unchanged, suggesting that 
the choice of estimator has little effect on the interpretation of asset dynamics in this study. 
5
  The primary limitation of the lowess estimator is its inability to produce confidence intervals for the smoothed line 
in order to perform a visual hypothesis test of asset accumulation.   As a substitute, 95% confidence intervals were 
generated with a first-degree local polynomial smoother and superimposed over the lowess smoother.  The 
estimators are not identical, but they are similar in their treatment of expected bivariate relationships.  The results 
are shown in Figure A.4 in the appendix.  In each case, the null hypothesis of no asset accumulation is rejected using 
the local polynomial smoothing estimator.  It may be assumed that lowess confidence intervals, if they could be 
generated, would be narrower than the band shown due to the repeated regressions run on each observation; 
therefore the reported confidence bands should be interpreted as a ―worst case‖  95% confidence interval. 
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poor households in the MFI Study, particularly those with an asset index between 0.5 and 1.0 in 
the first period, exhibit sustained and accelerated growth between rounds; in expectation these 
households doubled or even tripled their combination of productive assets during the thirteen-
year study.  Those households that did not experience asset poverty in the first round still 
experienced growth, though not to the same extent as the ones in asset poverty.  This pattern of 
dynamics does not indicate the presence of an asset poverty trap or evidence of a Micawber 
Threshold.  The MFI Study trajectory does, however, imply a potential convergence just out of 
sight roughly where the asset index level equals 2.0, but the data in this study do not permit an 
empirical confirmation of such a fact. 
 The lowess plot for the Ag Tech Study tells a similar story, but does not as readily  
indicate any level of asset convergence over time, if such a point exists for these households.  
The asset accumulation trajectory nearly parallels the equilibrium line over the entire domain of 
first-period asset ownership, though the lowess plot is somewhat closer to equilibrium at higher 
initial asset levels.  In contrast, the lowess plot in the FFE Study shows asset convergence at 1.7 
times the level of the asset poverty line.  As in the MFI and Ag Tech Studies, there is no 
evidence of a low-level poverty trap.  It should be noted that the convergence in the FFE Study is 
based on only a handful of observations that pull the lowess fitted values across the equilibrium 
line.  Although the same pattern is seen using POLS, random effects, and fixed effects, it is risky 
to put too much emphasis on this behavior as definitively convergent because of the low density 
of observations at that point. 
 For comparison, the lowess plots of the alternative model explored in Table 15 were also 
generated.  If the time trend obscures the relevance of assets in livelihood growth, it may be 
apparent in the asset accumulation trajectory.  Figure 6 reports these dynamics for each study 
67 
 
site.  Although some of the accumulation behaviors change at the tails of the model where there 
are fewer observations, the core observations reveal a similar trend as the one seen in Figure 5.  
Growth out of poverty still appears structural in this altered model, with large transitions out of 
poverty taking place over the course of the study.
6
 
 The results of the asset index estimation sharply contrast those of Quisumbing and 
Baulch (2009) in their asset poverty analysis of the same data set.  Their study estimated the 
growth in the value of particular assets over time as a function of household and community 
characteristics, idiosyncratic and covariate shocks, initial assets, and labor availability.  Using 
OLS with a fourth-degree polynomial specification, they estimate and plot separate indexes for 
landholdings, non-land assets, and agricultural durables in the three study sites.  Their results for 
land dynamics and agricultural durables dynamics indicate the presence of only an extremely 
low-level equilibrium poverty trap.  Non-land assets show a higher level of convergence, though 
they do not specifically say whether this point corresponds to a poor standard of living.  The 
results of Quisumbing and Baulch cast a more grim light on the prospects of households to 
escape poverty in rural Bangladesh.  They also seem inconsistent with the general trends 
observed in the present study.  Inflation-adjusted livelihood is undeniably on the rise in the same 
households studied by Quisumbing and Baulch, as are the values of most asset holdings (Tables 
7, 8, and 9).  The authors also report the same substantial decrease in poverty levels over time as 
seen in the transition matrices (Tables 1, 2, and 3).  That such tremendous growth could be 
possible in the face of low-level asset convergence would be unlikely. 
                                                          
6
 The principal concern driving the presentation of this additional, altered model is how the time trend influences 
asset accumulation.  The same question may be asked for the estimation of the asset index with separate regressions 
by round: if asset weights are permitted to vary over time to reflect a change in relative prices, how does asset 
accumulation behavior change?  Figure A.5, in the appendix, provides the asset trajectories for the three study sites 
generated from individual OLS regressions by round.  Again, while the exact shape of the lowess plots is somewhat 
different from the shape of the plots using fixed effects, the general interpretation of the results remains the same.  
Livelihood growth appears structural with some evidence of convergence in at least one study site.  Thus allowing 
asset weights to vary over time does not produce expected trends that contradict the findings with fixed effects. 
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By specifying asset growth as a function of stochastic events, the Quisumbing and Baulch 
model is likely unable to account for all of the relevant structural forces that contribute to 
welfare.  This study has attempted to address that gap by allowing structural forces to predict 
stochastic livelihood, rather than the other way around.  In addition, this study aggregates all 
assets into a single index instead of splitting them into different classes as do Quisumbing and 
Baulch.  In this way the interpretation of results is not misled by the dynamics of a single 
category of asset ownership.  If farmers are leaving agriculture in rural Bangladesh in favor of 
self-employment opportunities, they may sell off much of their land without sacrificing overall 
productive capacity.  Households’ land asset dynamics would demonstrate a low-level 
equilibrium but they may in fact be escaping asset poverty. 
 
6.4  Results of the Household Growth Model Estimation 
 The specification of the household-level growth model was predicated in part on the 
notion that the dependent variable, change in livelihood, was an appropriate substitution for the 
ideal variable, change in asset index, the latter being composed of fitted values and so subject to 
criticism about complications of endogeneity with respect to the independent variables.  Change 
in livelihood is only an acceptable replacement for change in the asset index if livelihood does in 
fact closely track asset levels.  Based on the results of the lowess plots of the asset index 
estimation, it is apparent that income changes over the two rounds are primarily structural in 
nature and not stochastic, being driven by capital accumulation of productive means over time.  
As the level of asset ownership has risen, income has grown in tandem.   Change in livelihood is 
therefore a reliable choice for the growth model regressand.  It remains to be seen whether this 
structural change was in some way influenced by access to microfinance services. 
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 The results of the growth model OLS regression for the three studies are presented in 
Table 16.  The most consistent result across all three study sites is the effect of base expenditures 
on change in livelihood: the level of first-period reported expenditures has a strongly negative 
and highly significant expected impact on the change in income for all households.  The response 
is largest in magnitude in the Ag Tech Study households, where a ten percent increase in 
reported baseline expenditures decreased expected change in livelihood by 0.08 PLUs.  This 
does not imply that wealthier households were necessarily worse off but that, relative to poorer 
households in the first round, the ones with greater purchasing power grew more slowly.  This 
fact resonates soundly with neoclassical microeconomic theory, which proposes that poorer 
households should grow more quickly on account of greater marginal returns to investments.  
The finding also agrees with the results of the asset index estimation, which demonstrate that 
poorer households appear to grow rapidly and in some cases ―catch up‖ or converge with 
wealthier households.  If poverty traps retained poorer households indefinitely in a spiral of low-
level expenditures, the coefficient estimate of baseline expenditures would very likely remain 
insignificant or even become positive as wealthy households grew their expenditures while poor 
households failed to accrue enough assets to lift their expenditures. 
 Similarly universal findings are the effect of baseline jewelry and baseline education 
levels.  It would seem a priori that jewelry ownership and expenditures would be highly 
correlated and would thus have similar expected signs on their coefficients; however the jewelry 
coefficient is in fact positive in all studies.  Recall that jewelry is often considered a buffer asset 
and is easily liquidated in the case of the need for consumption smoothing.  While it may seem 
unreasonable to assume that, in the MFI Study, first-period jewelry ownership would buffer 
expenditures thirteen years later in the second period, it may help to consider jewelry ownership 
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as an indicator of a household’s willingness to invest in stable assets, or even an indicator of the 
status of women within a household.  These two factors may plausibly have a positive impact on 
changes in livelihood: a constant possession of buffers against shocks will improve livelihood, 
while a collective household model with more rights for women may generally improve Pareto 
efficiency of resource allocation and thus overall household productivity.  In the MFI Study, the 
impact of the male as head of household actually decreases expected livelihood (the coefficient is 
nearly significant in the FFE Study), further corroborating the notion that female decisionmaking 
may chart a more productive course for the household. 
 The positive, significant impact of baseline education of household heads attests to the 
accuracy of the widely-accepted notion that investment in human capital—particularly through 
knowledge and training—is one of the most important avenues for public policy in a developing 
economy.  Education itself improves cognitive skills and reasoning, but more importantly orients 
a household’s values toward promoting education of children as well.  For this reason, even 
among households whose headship changes from father to son over the course of a decade-long 
study, the education level of the first-period household head continues to promote growth in 
livelihood.  In the Ag Tech and FFE Studies, the baseline ownership of land and equipment also 
significantly increased expected growth in livelihood, though growth due to animal ownership is 
mostly negligible. 
 The majority of shocks, both positive and negative, idiosyncratic and covariate, more 
distant and more recent, neither hinder nor promote household growth.  Negative idiosyncratic 
shocks to enterprise, business, or agriculture are insignificant in all studies.  Positive household-
level business shocks, on the other hand, exhibit impressive returns in the Ag Tech Study and 
FFE Study.  The occurrence of positive business shocks between 1996 and 2001 in the Ag Tech 
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Study households is expected to increase the change in livelihood by 0.33 PLUs.  This result, 
however, may be driven by endogeneity of the positive business shock variable: because finding 
a job or achieving large business gains may be highly correlated with unobserved traits—such as 
entrepreneurship—that may also effect growth in livelihood, the coefficient may be biased 
upward.
7
 
Some negative shocks are observed to work against growth; in the MFI Study negative 
life events between 1996 and 2001 caused a setback in growth.  That these more distant shocks 
influence the change in livelihood when more recent shocks do not may indicate either that full 
recovery from a shock is difficult in the long run, or that these shocks were larger in magnitude 
than more recent events.  In either case, full recovery for a household experiencing a negative 
shock is not necessarily a given.  Negative business shocks, however, appear to be managed with 
relative ease. 
 The only unexpected result of a shock must necessarily be discussed alongside the MFI 
duration variable.  In the MFI Study, a negative covariate (village-level) shock in the first 
interval actually tended to increase, rather than decrease, growth in livelihood.  There are two 
possible explanations for this unusual result.  First, it may be that the experience of a negative 
shock for these households caused them to cope in a way that increased their expenditures in 
order to return to previous consumption levels.  However, it is implausible that the effect of a 
negative covariate shock could exhibit such a magnitude of coping behavior five to ten years 
later.  In addition, if coping mechanisms were the motivating factor for this outcome, the sign of 
the negative life shock (1996-2001) variable in the same study site would likely share the 
                                                          
7
 This potential endogeneity does not bias the other coefficients, however; running the model without the positive 
business shocks does not change the results in any of the study sites. 
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positive sign, but this is not the case.  The other explanation of this unlikely result may be tied to 
MFI access. 
 Years of access to MFI services had no statistically significant effect in the Ag Tech and 
FFE Studies.  As suggested by the plots of asset dynamics, the growth of these households is not 
likely to be constrained by limited returns to assets, so microfinance is not expected to play a 
significant role in increasing expenditures over time.  Neither is there reason to believe, based on 
observed asset dynamics, that microfinance should be any more critical to livelihood growth in 
the MFI Study.  The results of the OLS regression of MFI Study households, however, predict a 
negative coefficient on the years of MFI access.  Several explanations present themselves.  First, 
the households with a longer duration of access to microfinance may have experienced growth in 
livelihood much earlier than other households, and thus the MFI duration variable is highly 
collinear with baseline expenditures.   But the correlation between baseline expenditures and 
years of access to MFI services in this study is 0.0059, so this explanation is unlikely.  Second, 
the coefficient may be negative because of the hypothesis postulated by Menon (2006) that 
households with longer MFI membership timeframes come closer to exhausting the usefulness of 
microcredit for their consumption benefits than households who are receiving their first loan.  
Third, it may be the case after all that the variable for years of MFI access suffers from 
endogeneity or collinearity problems that bias its own coefficient estimate and that of other 
variables as well. 
 This last point may explain both what drives the negative coefficient on MFI duration and 
the positive coefficient on negative covariate shocks.  An MFI with a development-oriented 
mission and the ability to expand its services will in all probability respond to a disaster, such as 
a flood, by establishing a branch in affected villages.  If this is the case, then the MFIs did their 
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job: households susceptible to negative shock were able to increase their livelihood thanks to the 
loans that they secured through a local MFI.  To discover whether the MFI duration variable 
biases the estimates, each study site’s growth model was regressed without the variable as a test 
of robustness. 
The coefficients are compared in Table 17.  The results incriminate the MFI duration 
variable in the biasing of the coefficient of negative covariate shocks in the MFI Study.  With the 
MFI duration variable, the shock’s effect appears to be positive on change in livelihood; without 
it, the effect is statistically insignificant.  The rest of the MFI Study appears robust to the 
removal of the MFI duration variable.  The coefficients of the Ag Tech and FFE Study sites also 
exhibit virtually no change when the variable is removed.  It seems the biasing problem of MFI 
duration is isolated to one variable in one study only.  Although the bias confounds the estimates 
of the true impacts of MFI access in the MFI Study, it tells an interesting story about the 
unfolding of microfinance services in these particular villages.  The agencies likely entered the 
villages nonrandomly according to the propensity to experience natural disasters instead of some 
other observable characteristic such as landholdings. 
For the sake of comparison, an altered model using a modified measure of MFI duration 
is presented in Table 18.  Here the original, single measure of years of access to any MFI is 
contrasted to an additive measure in which the years of access to all MFIs are added together (for 
example, 12 years of Grameen Bank access and 15 years of BRAC access provide a total of 27 
years of MFI access).  This new measure may be effective in capturing stronger effects of MFI 
access to the extent that MFI products, missions, or business models within a village differ; the 
additive measure would then be an upper bound of combined MFI effects.  To the extent that 
MFIs within a village share characteristics, however, the single measure is appropriate.  With an 
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additive measure of MFI access, the weakly significant negative life shock variable becomes 
insignificant, but the positive effect of a negative covariate shock remains positive and 
significant.  That the significance of the MFI duration variable disappears may indicate that not 
every MFI to enter a village did so on the basis of the risk of covariate shocks.  Duration of MFI 
services does not appear to have any additive effect when multiple MFIs are operating in the 
same village. 
 The MFI duration variable is more likely to suffer from collinearity than endogeneity 
problems.  An endogenous regressor is strongly correlated to the outcome variable through some 
unobserved element of the error term.  Because MFIs are likely to open branches based on 
observable characteristics such as landholdings, asset ownership, or occurrence of shocks, 
controlling for these features reduces the probability of endogeneity concerns.  At the same time, 
the change in the significance of the shock variable upon the removal of the MFI duration 
variable (as in Table 17) is a classic sign of collinearity.  In addition, a high correlation exists 
between the MFI duration variable and the covariate shock variables in the MFI Study site: for 
shocks between 1996 and 2001, the correlation is 0.56; for shocks between 2002 and 2007, the 
correlation is 0.63.  It is likely that the particular covariate shocks reported in this data set were 
not themselves responsible for the MFIs’ decision to open a branch in the villages, but rather that 
the occurrence of covariate shocks is an indicator of villages that are more prone to such 
disasters (for example, villages near a river are more likely to experience flooding during the 
monsoon rains).  In fact, the correlation between a covariate shock in the first and second shock 
interval is 0.67, and every village experiencing a shock between 1996 and 2001 also had a shock 
between 2002 and 2007. 
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 One formal test for the presence of multicollinearity is a check of the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) of each of the variables in the regression.  A high VIF (in general, greater than 10) 
is a strong signal of a collinearity problem among variables.  Table 19 reports the VIFs of all 
three study sites for the purposes of comparison.  The variance inflation factors of every variable 
are higher in the MFI Study than in the Ag Tech or FFE Studies, but are low enough so as not to 
be alarming.  Nevertheless, the MFI duration variable and the negative covariate shock variables 
show VIFs about two times larger in the MFI Study site compared to the other two sites.  
Although this formal test fails to reveal severe problems, the other signs of multicollinearity—
change in significance with a slight change in the model and high correlation coefficients—hint 
that there is an underlying relationship between negative shocks and the introduction of 
microfinance services. 
If MFIs are more likely to operate in villages vulnerable to shocks, then they may have a 
longer average working duration there than in villages not experiencing a shock, and they may 
also allow for rapid growth in expenditures following a shock.  It is in fact the case that MFI 
Study villages experiencing a negative covariate shock have, on average, 5.6 years more 
exposure to MFI services (significant with  =0.001), suggesting that MFIs moved in earlier 
where shocks were more likely to occur.  Although this collinearity presents a problem in the 
analysis, it cannot be corrected without dropping a critical variable in the model, so it is better to 
preserve the original model and acknowledge the observation that MFIs opened branches 
nonrandomly. 
Many other specifications of the growth model may be proposed to measure MFI access 
differently.  Binary variables may be introduced to capture whether MFIs were present in a 
village during the baseline or whether an MFI opened in a village between rounds.  Another 
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measure of years of access to MFI services may be the number of years between the two survey 
rounds that a household could access an MFI, rather than the greatest number of years that any 
MFI was present.  Each of these models, however, produces results with a similar interpretation 
to the one given for the original model: most measures of MFI access are highly correlated with 
the experience of covariate shocks.  A model may also be proposed that captures the effects of a 
household’s joining a credit organization between the two rounds to examine the effect on 
growth; problematically some of the surveys are imprecise regarding whether and when a 
household became a member of an MFI, and such a model would suffer from endogeneity issues 
in the current estimation framework.  Truly, measuring the long-term effects of microfinance is a 
challenging proposition.  While the results of this study may lack the more definitive clarity that 
a short-term impact evaluation would provide, it is useful to note the way in which MFI services 
unfold in shock-prone villages, and the fact that households may recover more readily from these 
shocks in villages with microfinance institutions that have been established for a longer period of 
time. 
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CHAPTER 7:  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
7.1  Discussion 
 The introduction of asset dynamics as the structural basis for income and expenditures 
has ushered in a new generation of poverty measurement.  Asset measures are preferred over 
expenditure measures because assets are often more easily observed, are usually less prone to 
recall bias or measurement error, and tend not to fluctuate as readily with seasonal variation and 
in the wake of disturbances like shocks.  Productive assets include common measures of 
physical, human, natural, and social capital that are expected to generate returns.  If a household 
owns few assets in the face of locally increasing returns, accumulating assets may require a 
significant sacrifice of consumption that may be out of reach of subsistence farmers.  If the 
household’s assets cannot produce an income above the poverty line, the household is stuck in a 
poverty trap. 
 Microfinance institutions address the credit market failure that promulgates poverty traps.  
By providing lump sums of cash to credit-constrained households, MFIs permit the lowering or 
elimination of the barriers to the acquisition of more productive assets.  With a small loan, a 
household may obtain the means to generate more income and use the returns of new assets to 
pay off the loan and grow out of poverty.  Microfinance offers savings and loan services where 
traditional banks cannot by relying on specific mechanisms to ensure proper screening, 
monitoring, and enforcing.  Novel commitment devices ensure the bank has a form of collateral 
to protect its investment.  The rigid structure of loans guarantees rapid repayment (or rapid 
detection of delinquency) for the bank, and offers training in financial discipline for the client. 
 Using panel data from three studies in rural Bangladesh with three different intervals 
between rounds, this analysis found no evidence of low-level asset equilibria or poverty traps.  In 
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all three study sites, accumulation trajectories lie well above the equilibrium line, suggesting 
that, in expectation, asset-poor households have not been sufficiently credit-constrained to 
prevent their growth out of poverty.   The households of the FFE Study site demonstrate a level 
of convergence above the poverty line, but the low number of observations around this point 
makes the evidence of convergence somewhat tenuous.  These results differ from those of 
Quisumbing and Baulch (2009) who found low-level convergence for two different classes of 
assets.  However, their division of assets may lead to spurious conclusions if certain assets are 
diminishing for reasons related to rural growth out of poverty, such as the decreasing of 
agriculture in the overall contribution to household income. 
  The role of microfinance in the observed structural transitions in this analysis remains 
unclear.  There is no evidence that access to MFIs contributes to growth out of poverty in the Ag 
Tech or FFE Study sites.  In the MFI Study site, the duration of years of access to MFIs is highly 
correlated to the presence of a covariate shock in both the first and second shock intervals (1996-
2001, and 2002-2007 respectively).  It seems likely that MFIs are concentrated in villages where 
shocks such as flooding and cyclones have a higher probability of occurrence.  If this is the case, 
MFIs are more likely to be present in these villages for a longer time, and they allow households 
experiencing a shock to smooth their consumption. 
 The lack of any conclusion regarding the effects of microfinance, particularly in the Ag 
Tech and FFE Study sites, does not specifically signal that microfinance is not an effective tool 
for combating poverty but rather that, in rural Bangladesh, access to MFIs is just one small piece 
of a much larger picture of socioeconomic transformation.  Larger underlying forces, such as the 
widespread movement of households into self-employment and entrepreneurial opportunities 
documented in Tables 4 and 5, increased access to and enrollment in education, better 
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infrastructure networks, and ever-greater integration of economies through globalization, may be 
providing new opportunities over the course of this study that overshadow the impacts of 
microfinance.  The observed structural transitions out of poverty, regardless of the role of access 
to MFI services, indicates that rural Bangladesh has built up considerable momentum toward its 
development goals. 
 
7.2  Policy Implications 
 Among the asset dynamics literature, in which multiple stable asset equilibria or single, 
low-level convergences are often detected, this study represents a unique outcome.  Households 
in rural Bangladesh over the past two decades have been able to climb the ladder of productive 
assets out of expenditure poverty.  This process, though necessarily slow and tedious, indicates 
that time is one of the most important assets upon which the aspiring poor may rely.  Poverty 
transitions rarely occur as quickly and as dramatically as policymakers hope.  Aligning policies 
with an understanding of the timetable and mechanisms of real growth will produce the most 
favorable outcomes in the long run. 
 Studies that take care to dissect the drivers of growth in rural settings are critical in 
designing appropriate interventions in the lives of the poor.  Targeted aid may be structured in a 
way to provide the maximum impact per dollar spent by taking asset returns and constraints into 
consideration.  Indeed, it would be inefficient to do otherwise.  In the case of the households in 
this study, attempting to add to an average household’s productive asset base with an in-kind 
transfer of poultry is not likely to have any noticeable welfare benefits.  In contrast, programs 
that promote education and expand access to learning resources are likely to yield large returns 
to long-term growth in expenditures.  Similarly, if jewelry ownership may be taken as a proxy of 
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women’s status, the creation of empowerment programs and women’s social or support groups 
may have positive effects on household growth.  The capacity to use and develop land also may 
contribute to improved welfare.  These three core components of poverty alleviation in 
Bangladesh—education, women’s equality, and land rights—resonate with the most fundamental 
findings in development literature.  Although they can be promoted through NGOs and 
international development agencies, these specific goals are prime targets for governments which 
are the principal providers of education and protection of the rights of citizenship under law. 
 The promotion of microfinance, on the other hand, may be a niche more appropriately 
filled by charitable and private-sector organizations.  The provision of loans is one example of 
both a ―cargo net‖ and ―safety net‖ poverty-fighting strategy set forth by Barrett (2005).  The 
cargo net dimension of microfinance means that a small loan can provide the initial infusion of 
capital that triggers a virtuous cycle of productivity, earnings, and reinvestment.  This study 
provides strong evidence to favor the conventional microeconomic theory that the poor have 
high marginal returns to their investments, at least in the context of rural Bangladesh.  As a 
safety net, microfinance may provide a fallback strategy when severe losses threaten to wipe out 
a household’s productive asset base.  The results of this analysis offer evidence that when MFIs 
are available in shock-prone villages, expenditures following a negative shock are more likely to 
remain high.  MFIs seeking a way to more accurately target their services may consider this 
important characteristic when deciding how to expand.  An understanding of the vulnerability of 
potential clients to covariate shocks may provide a way to generate the biggest impact.  Given 
the apparent effect of credit in the wake of widespread shocks, further research is warranted into 
emerging microinsurance markets for small farmers exposed to the risk of droughts or floods, 
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particularly when these shocks threaten their most productive assets such as land, livestock, or 
poultry. 
 
7.3  Limitations of This Study 
 Some of the analyses conducted in this study were constrained by the availability of 
quality data for particular variables.  The asset index estimation, though itself a robust model 
with a high R
2
 value, would have benefited from the inclusion of more measures of capital, 
especially social and natural capital.  The absence of networking variables from the Ag Tech and 
FFE Studies prevented their inclusion in the index.  The amount of missing age data precluded 
the appropriate categorization of human capital into working and dependent components, and 
resulted in the use of the inferior measure of household size instead.  In addition, the use of self-
reported asset values, though justifiable for many reasons and arguably the most reliable way to 
value productive assets for the purposes of this study, remains susceptible to the reporting bias of 
each individual household interviewed; a more complete understanding of local markets and a 
more thorough evaluation of local prices at the time of the interviews would provide a richer 
understanding of the values of goods and, perhaps more importantly, the relative liquidity of 
particular assets.  Finally, the asset index estimation suffered the loss of thana-level spatial 
heterogeneity on account of the use of the fixed effects model.  As a result, it must be assumed 
that asset accumulation patterns are not significantly different among thanas, even those 
separated by a great distance. 
 Data limitations also played a role in the selection of the MFI impact variable.  For the 
sake of this study, the variable was designed so as to be comparable across the three study sites. 
This design, however, is inherently less rigorous than a strict household-level participation 
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variable that could be chosen in a more narrow study focusing only on the MFI Study households 
within a shorter timeframe.  In addition to the MFI variable compromise, this study was 
hampered by limited knowledge of the ground operations of the four different MFIs represented 
in the study sites—specifically, the ways in which the MFIs interact within a single village, the 
effect of different business models on client behavior and loan consumption, the lending 
strategies and flexibility of banking products, and the method of selection of villages for new 
branches.  Parsing the model by any of these measures would permit a higher resolution of the 
impact of credit on livelihood.  Finally, the attempt to study the impacts of credit over such a vast 
time horizon is unprecedented due to the uncertainty about any causal inferences.  Using only 
two periods of observations set years apart, it is considerably more challenging to definitively 
isolate the contribution of microfinance to growth in expenditures. 
 
7.4  Future Work 
 In spite of these limitations, the conclusions of this study lay a solid foundation for 
further inquiry into the nature of poverty transitions in Bangladesh.  In consideration of structural 
transitions out of expenditure poverty, only one intervention—microfinance—was assessed for 
impact, but data were also gathered on the agricultural technology and food-for-education 
programs.  It is easy to imagine that these programs, designed to encourage the accumulation of 
specific types of capital (agricultural assets in the Ag Tech Study and educational assets in the 
FFE Study), may also impact asset growth, and in ways different from those of microfinance.  
Moreover, asset ownership is the basis for income generation but does not guarantee that 
individual necessities such as access to diverse food and nutrients are satisfied.  The effect of 
asset accumulation on other welfare indicators has implications for poverty.  Whether poverty 
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persists is also a function of the successful transmission of productive assets from one generation 
to another; that is, intergenerational poverty dynamics may have entirely different consequences 
for poverty reduction if a household’s assets are divided among a large number of children.  
Long-term studies, including the one used here, permit this kind of analysis by surveying both 
core households and those formed by the children of these households. 
 
7.5  Conclusion 
Can it be resolved that poverty is vanishing from Bangladesh and no further interventions 
are required?  While the results presented here are promising and signal an optimistic outlook for 
the future of the Bangladeshi poor, the advice of Amartya Sen (1979) implores policymakers to 
take stock of societal conventions before making a judgment about whether development goals 
are on pace.  While one of the goals of development is to permit individuals to live above an 
asset or expenditure poverty line, such a benchmark is constructed based on an assessment of the 
minimum consumption needs.  Whether individuals are flourishing, however, is another matter 
altogether.  Financial security is just one component of a portfolio of human development that, 
like any sound investment, ought to be diversified.  Beyond ending extreme poverty, the U.N. 
Millennium Development Goals are striving to end hunger, promote broad access to education, 
safeguard the rights of women and children, advance medical technology and understanding, and 
ensure the protection of the environment for the generations to follow.  The end of asset poverty 
is bound up in these goals and expedited by their accomplishment. 
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TABLES 
 
 
Table 1.  Household Expenditures Poverty Transition Matrix, MFI Study. 
 
 Poor 2007 Nonpoor 2007 Total 
Poor 1994 
48    
(17.7%) 
125     
(46.1%) 
163 
(60.1%) 
Nonpoor 1994 
10     
(3.7%) 
88    
(32.5%) 
98 
(39.9%) 
Total 
58 
(21.4%) 
213 
(78.6%) 
271 
(100.0%) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Household Expenditures Poverty Transition Matrix, Ag Tech Study. 
 
 Poor 2007 Nonpoor 2007 Total 
Poor 1996 
58    
(8.4%) 
312     
(45.2%) 
370 
(53.5%) 
Nonpoor 1996 
27     
(3.9%) 
294    
(42.5%) 
321 
(46.5%) 
Total 
85 
(12.3%) 
606 
(87.7%) 
691 
(100.0%) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Household Expenditures Poverty Transition Matrix, FFE Study. 
 
 Poor 2007 Nonpoor 2007 Total 
Poor 2003 
102    
(22.6%) 
146     
(32.3%) 
248 
(54.9%) 
Nonpoor 2003 
26     
(5.8%) 
180    
(39.8%) 
206 
(45.6%) 
Total 
128 
(28.3%) 
326 
(72.1%) 
452 
(100%) 
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Table 4.  Trends in Primary Occupation (Percent of Sample), Household Head. 
 
Occupation Round 1 Round 2 Change 
MFI Study    
   Agriculture 54.28 19.91 -34.37 
   Durables Trader 15.15 13.94 -1.21 
   Fishing/Boatman 4.28 0.25
+ 
-4.03 
   Self-Employment n/a 20.40 n/a 
    
Ag Tech Study    
   Agriculture 55.49 35.09 -20.4 
   Durables Trader 12.44 16.13 3.69 
   Rickshaw Puller 6.79 6.97 -0.18 
   Household Work 4.45 10.37 5.92 
    
FFE Study    
   Agriculture 22.43 14.18 -8.25 
   Durable Trader 10.26 11.81 1.55 
   Raising Fish/Fishing 24.15 2.62 -21.53 
   Self-Employment 1.28 23.03 21.75 
+
 While the instance of fishing declined dramatically in this round, fish trading was reported as 
the occupation of 7.21% of household heads.  This occupation was not reported in round 1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Trends in Primary Occupation (Percent of Sample), Spouse of Head. 
 
Occupation Round 1 Round 2 Change 
MFI Study    
   Household Work 89.08 65.23 -23.85 
   Durables Trader 2.59 0.86 -1.73 
   Agriculture 1.72 24.14 22.42 
   Student 1.15 0.57 -0.58 
    
Ag Tech Study    
   Household Work 94.16 82.99 -11.17 
   Handicrafts 1.24 1.12 -0.12 
   Agriculture 0.66 10.69 10.03 
   Student 0.40 0.56 0.16 
    
FFE Study    
   Household Work 87.98 82.95 -5.03 
   House Maid 1.20 1.59 0.39 
   Agriculture 1.20 10.46 9.26 
   Tailor/Seamstress 6.06 1.60 -4.46 
92 
 
Table 6.  Average Individual Physical Asset Holdings as a Share of Total. 
 
 Livestock Poultry Equipment Jewelry Land 
MFI Study      
   Round 1 (1994) 0.049 0.014 0.065 0.022 0.849 
   Round 2 (2007) 0.066 0.011 0.045 0.032 0.845 
   Change 0.017 -0.003 -0.020** 0.010* -0.004 
 
Ag Tech Study 
     
   Round 1 (1996) 0.048 0.009 0.054 0.014 0.875 
   Round 2 (2007) 0.052 0.004 0.032 0.030 0.881 
   Change 0.004 -0.005*** -0.022*** 0.016*** 0.006 
 
FFE Study 
     
   Round 1 (2003) 0.031 0.018 0.056 0.026 0.868 
   Round 2 (2007) 0.102 0.012 0.059 0.038 0.789 
   Change 0.070*** -0.006 0.003 0.012* -0.079*** 
 
Note: Asterisks denote significance levels of t-tests: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.  Average Household Livestock Ownership in Round 1. 
 
Animal Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
MFI Study     
     Livestock 1.56 1.92 0 12 
     Poultry 5.01 6.46 0 45 
Ag Tech Study     
     Livestock 2.22 2.25 0 15 
     Poultry 6.87 8.00 0 92 
FFE Study     
     Livestock 0.91 1.67 0 14 
     Poultry 5.19 10.48 0 200 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
Table 8.  Summary Statistics for Variables in Asset Index Estimation, MFI Study. 
 
 
Variable 
Mean 
1994 
Standard  
Deviation 
 Mean 
2007 
Standard 
Deviation 
    
  
 
 
Livelihood 0.947 0.581  1.580 0.951 
      
Livestock (value) 5,483 8,947  11,770 16,274 
Poultry (value) 359.6 488.9  509.0 469.5 
Equipment (value) 4965.4 20,241  7,338 19,652 
Jewelry (value) 2,032 5,416  9,251 20,247 
Land (value) 150,420 252,326  480,979 978,761 
Household Size 5.190 2.323  6.806 2.516 
Age of Head 43.25 12.88  48.65 11.48 
Education of Head 3.155 4.204  4.345 4.237 
Distance to Village of 
Head’s Parents (km) 
3.872 21.21  0.155 0.734 
Distance to Village of 
Spouse’s Parents (km) 
8.143 27.22  4.256 9.765 
Male Household Head 0.943 0.231  0.996 0.0657 
      
Thana omitting Bahubal
+ 
     
      Ulipur 0.110 0.314  0.099 0.299 
      Rajarhat 0.217 0.413  0.203 0.403 
      Shaturia 0.259 0.439  0.272 0.446 
      Trishal 0.208 0.407  0.203 0.406 
      
Observations 336   232  
      
Note: Values provided in 1994 are adjusted by the consumer price index and reported in real 
2007 taka for ease of direct comparison. 
+
Thana binary variables are included here for completeness; they are estimable in random effects 
and pooled OLS models, but not in the fixed effects model used throughout the analysis.  
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Table 9.  Summary Statistics for Variables in Asset Index Estimation, Ag Tech Study. 
 
 
Variable 
Mean 
1996 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Mean 
2007 
Standard 
Deviation 
      
Livelihood 1.069 0.627  1.861 0.989 
      
Livestock (value) 10,029 11,079  17,815 26,942 
Poultry (value) 663.3 789.2  745.4 2,353 
Equipment (value) 9,796 28,800  11,988 64,593 
Jewelry (value) 2,784 5,851  12,389 27,888 
Land (value) 365,131 484,592  731,262 1.039e+06 
Household Size 5.498 2.461  6.558 2.634 
Age of Head 44.77 12.93  50.23 11.52 
Education of Head 3.116 4.003  3.676 4.213 
Male Household Head 0.955 0.207  0.880 0.325 
      
Thana omitting Jessore Sadar
+ 
     
     Saturia 0.327 0.470  0.343 0.475 
     Pakundia 0.186 0.389  0.182 0.387 
     Gaffargaon 0.147 0.355  0.155 0.362 
      
Observations 956   685  
      
Note: Values provided in 1996 are adjusted by the consumer price index and reported in real 
2007 taka for ease of direct comparison. 
+
Thana binary variables are included here for completeness; they are estimable in random effects 
and pooled OLS models, but not in the fixed effects model used throughout the analysis.  
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Table 10.  Summary Statistics for Asset Index Variables, FFE Study. 
 
 
Variable 
Mean 
2003 
Standard  
Deviation 
 Mean 
2007 
Standard 
Deviation 
    
  
 
 
Livelihood 1.137 0.650  1.456 0.822 
 
  
   
Livestock (value) 4,511 10,269  12,568 20,591 
Poultry (value) 565.3 800.6  457.2 722.4 
Equipment (value) 3,758 11,167  4,448 9,011 
Jewelry (value) 3,394 8,244  4,933 13,827 
Land (value) 338,151 871,420  253,096 506,339 
Household Size 6.082 2.182  7.839 5.925 
Age of Head 46.19 9.966  46.07 11.42 
Education of Head 2.761 3.758  2.862 3.747 
Male Household Head 0.885 0.319  0.868 0.339 
      
Thana omitting Chakaria
+
      
      Nilphamari Sadar 0.130 0.337  0.127 0.334 
      Mohadebpur 0.130 0.337  0.129 0.336 
      Sherpur Sadar 0.126 0.332  0.127 0.334 
      Madhupur 0.121 0.327  0.123 0.329 
      Nayagati 0.126 0.332  0.129 0.336 
      Agioljhara 0.128 0.334  0.127 0.334 
      Hazigonj 0.124 0.330  0.118 0.323 
      
Observations 461   448  
      
Note: Values provided in 2003 are adjusted by the consumer price index and reported in real 
2007 taka for ease of direct comparison. 
+
Thana binary variables are included here for completeness; they are estimable in random effects 
and pooled OLS models, but not in the fixed effects model used throughout the analysis.  
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Table 11.  Summary Statistics for Household Growth Model Variables, All Sites. 
 
Variable 
MFI Study Ag Tech Study FFE Study 
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
       
Change in Livelihood 0.637 0.809 0.788 1.027 0.326 0.709 
       
Years MFI Access 20.52 4.547 17.77 6.078 16.09 5.273 
Expenditures0 920.9 584.2 1106.3 652.4 1462.2 846.8 
Neg. Covariate Shock, 
1996-2001 
0.376 0.485 0.407 0.492   
Neg. Covariate Shock, 
2002-2007+ 
0.578 0.495 0.323 0.468 0.446 0.498 
Neg. Life Shock, 
1996-2001 
0.338 0.474 0.240 0.428   
Neg. Life Shock, 
2002-2007+ 
0.627 0.484 0.538 0.499 0.691 0.463 
Neg. Business Shock, 
1996-2007 
0.240 0.428 0.165 0.371   
Neg. Business Shock, 
2002-2007+ 
0.464 0.500 0.470 0.499 0.596 0.491 
Pos. Life Shock,   
1996-2001 
0.0608 0.239 0.0854 0.28   
Pos. Life Shock,   
2002-2007+ 
0.148 0.356 0.178 0.383 0.0987 0.299 
Pos. Business Shock, 
1996-2007 
0.0646 0.246 0.0912 0.288   
Pos. Business Shock, 
2002-2007+ 
0.426 0.495 0.457 0.499 0.244 0.430 
       
Observations 263  691  446  
       
Note:  ―Life‖ and ―business‖ shocks are idiosyncratic to a household, while ―covariate‖ shocks 
represent village-level events.  Expenditures, livestock, poultry, equipment, jewelry, and land are 
measured as values in taka.  Base expenditures are adjusted by the consumer price index and 
reported in real 2007 taka. 
+In the FFE Study, these shocks include events occurring only in the years 2003-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
Table 12.  Idiosyncratic Shocks in Growth Model Binary Variable. 
 
 Negative Positive 
Life 
Shocks 
 
Serious illness or death 
Divorce of head and spouse 
Payment of dowry 
 
Receipt of new remittance or dowry 
Receipt of inheritance 
Beginning of pension 
Business 
Shocks 
 
Loss of crops, assets, or livestock 
Failure of business or enterprise 
Loss of job 
 
Realizing unusually large business gains 
Receipt of education scholarship 
Finding a new job 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13.  Correlation Between Years of MFI Access and Physical Asset Values. 
 
Asset MFI Study Ag Tech Study FFE Study 
    
Livestock 0.0854 - 0.0418 - 0.0127 
Poultry 0.1818 - 0.0703 0.0699 
Equipment 0.0398 0.0208 0.0615 
Jewelry 0.0655 - 0.0756 - 0.0394 
Land 0.0910 - 0.2096 - 0.0788 
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Table 14.  Panel Fixed Effects Estimates for Asset Index, All Study Sites. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Livelihood 
MFI Study Ag Tech Study FFE Study 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
       
Livestock -2.61e-06 -0.460 3.97e-06* 1.775 9.89e-07 0.332 
Livestock 
2 
6.00e-11 0.598 -1.73e-11** -2.259 -1.18e-11 -0.763 
Poultry -0.0004* -1.672 -6.18e-05 -0.925 8.82e-05 1.192 
Poultry 
2
 2.66e-07** 2.128 1.31e-09 1.152 -3.19e-09 -0.469 
Equipment 1.53e-06 0.244 1.73e-06 0.745 1.65e-05 0.986 
Equipment 
2
 5.95e-11 1.245 -1.29e-12 -0.898 8.15e-11 0.250 
Jewelry 2.04e-5*** 2.989 1.36e-05*** 3.900 -6.12e-06 -1.071 
Jewelry 
2
 -1.02e-10* -1.913 -2.25e-11*** -3.071 1.78e-10*** 3.154 
Land 4.40e-07** 2.287 3.78e-07*** 4.271 2.05e-07 1.128 
Land 
2
 -5.65e-14*** -3.059 -4.62e-14*** -3.829 -1.66e-14 -0.556 
Household Size -0.1409** -2.091 -0.407*** -8.061 -0.0535** -2.336 
Household Size 
2
 0.0005 0.116 0.0106*** 4.082 0.000702** 2.022 
Age of Head 0.0243 1.120 0.0235* 1.839 -0.0236** -2.039 
Age of Head 
2
 -0.0003 -1.161 -0.000184 -1.439 0.000180 1.509 
Education of Head 0.0751 1.426 0.0987** 2.042 0.0310 0.456 
Education of Head 
2
 -0.0065* -1.723 -0.00580** -2.185 -0.000895 -0.111 
Male Household Head 0.2887 0.974 -0.121 -0.774 0.0913 0.958 
Second Round 0.6032*** 6.864 0.818*** 11.22 0.290*** 6.896 
 
Distance to Village of 
Head’s Parents 
 
0.0043 
 
0.7865 
    
Distance to Village of 
Head’s Parents 2 
-0.0001* -1.9273     
Distance to Village of 
Spouse’s Parents 
-0.0002 -0.0277     
Distance to Village of 
Spouse’s Parents 2 
-8.27e-06 -0.4728     
       
Constant 0.8149 1.3979 2.087*** 5.434 1.877*** 4.797 
Overall R
2
 0.3467  0.2254  0.3420  
Between R
2
 0.2192  0.1170  0.3629  
Within R
2 
0.6304  0.4934  0.3095  
Observations 568  1,641  909  
       
Note:  Asterisks denote levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.   
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Table 15.  Asset Index Fixed Effects Estimates Including and Excluding Time Trend, All Sites. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Livelihood 
MFI Study Ag Tech Study FFE Study 
Including Excluding Including Excluding Including Excluding 
       
Livestock -2.61e-06 6.72e-06 3.97e-06* 8.42e-06*** 9.89e-07 7.56e-06*** 
Livestock 
2 
6.00e-11 -6.75e-11 -1.73e-11** -3.16e-11*** -1.18e-11 -5.08e-11*** 
Poultry -0.0004* -0.000181 -6.18e-05 -4.13e-05 8.82e-05 0.000122 
Poultry 
2
 2.66e-07** 2.13e-07 1.31e-09 8.99e-10 -3.19e-09 -6.39e-09 
Equipment 1.53e-06 3.06e-06 1.73e-06 1.08e-06 1.65e-05 2.43e-05 
Equipment 
2
 5.95e-11 5.03e-11 -1.29e-12 -9.72e-13 8.15e-11 -3.43e-11 
Jewelry 2.04e-5*** 2.81e-05*** 1.36e-05*** 1.63e-05*** -6.12e-06 -3.61e-06 
Jewelry 
2
 -1.02e-10* -1.74e-10*** -2.25e-11*** -3.48e-11*** 1.78e-10*** 1.73e-10*** 
Land 4.40e-07** 7.29e-07*** 3.78e-07*** 6.85e-07*** 2.05e-07 2.52e-07 
Land 
2
 -5.65e-14*** -8.06e-14*** -4.62e-14*** -7.46e-14*** -1.66e-14 -3.41e-14 
Household Size -0.1409** 0.0592 -0.407*** -0.135*** -0.0535** 0.0808 
Household Size 
2
 0.0005 -0.00846* 0.0106*** 0.00297 0.000702** -0.00408 
Age of Head 0.0243 0.0253 0.0235* 0.0610*** -0.0236** -0.0140 
Age of Head 
2
 -0.0003 -0.000187 -0.000184 -0.000383** 0.000180 0.000169 
Education of Head 0.0751 0.190*** 0.0987** 0.150*** 0.0310 0.0121 
Education of Head 
2
 -0.0065* -0.0126*** -0.00580** -0.00551* -0.000895 -0.000210 
Male Household Head 0.2887 0.172 -0.121 -0.580*** 0.0913 0.00742 
Second Round 0.6032***  0.818***  0.290***  
 
Distance to Village  
of Head’s Parents 
 
0.0043 0.00204 
    
Distance to Village  
of Head’s Parents 
2
 
-0.0001* -5.63e-05     
Distance to Village  
of Spouse’s Parents 
-0.0002 -0.000305     
Distance to Village  
of Spouse’s Parents 
2
 
-8.27e-06 -1.21e-05     
       
Constant 0.8149 -0.265 2.087*** -0.0878 1.877*** 1.128*** 
Overall R
2
 0.3467 0.4070 0.2254 0.2808 0.3420 0.3226 
Between R
2
 0.2192 0.3414 0.1170 0.2346 0.3629 0.3546 
Within R
2 
0.6304 0.5618 0.4934 0.4022 0.3095 0.2341 
Observations 568 568 1,641 1,641 909 909 
       
Note:  Asterisks denote levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.   
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Table 16.  Growth Model Estimates of MFI Impact, All Sites. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Change in Livelihood 
MFI Study Ag Tech Study FFE Study 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
       
ln(Expenditures0) -0.414*** -3.035 -0.832*** -4.174 -0.650*** -8.061 
ln(Livestock0) 0.0312** 2.362 -0.00694 -0.731 0.00333 0.414 
ln(Poultry0) 0.000768 0.0343 0.000452 0.0209 0.00150 0.112 
ln(Equipment0) 0.000711 0.0226 0.131*** 4.084 0.0912** 2.573 
ln(Jewelry0) 0.0369** 2.363 0.0340* 1.749 0.0265** 2.294 
ln(Land0) -0.0101 -0.391 0.0635*** 3.087 0.0194** 2.095 
ln(Household Size0) 0.148 0.704 -0.0234 -0.109 -0.340*** -3.029 
ln(Age of Head0) -0.106 -0.598 -0.122 -0.822 -0.178 -1.094 
ln(Education of Head0) 0.107* 1.933 0.122*** 3.080 0.0680** 1.983 
Male H.H. Head0 -0.330* -1.902 -0.209 -1.158 -0.232 -1.643 
Neg. Covariate Shock, 
1996-2001 
0.353** 2.309 -0.0379 -0.444   
Neg. Covariate Shock, 
2002-2007
+ 
0.0367 0.262 0.00789 0.0913 -0.0952 -1.535 
Neg. Life Shock, 1996-
2001 
-0.203* -1.665 -0.103 -1.311   
Neg. Life Shock, 2002-
2007
+
 
-0.0104 -0.103 0.0402 0.509 0.0190 0.256 
Neg. Business Shock, 
1996-2007 
-0.104 -0.812 -0.150 -1.587   
Neg. Business Shock, 
2002-2007
+
 
0.121 1.092 -0.0194 -0.263 -0.0445 -0.681 
Pos. Life Shock,   1996-
2001 
-0.108 -0.650 0.108 0.880   
Pos. Life Shock,   2002-
2007
+
 
-0.0442 -0.278 -0.0106 -0.122 0.178 1.365 
Pos. Business Shock, 
1996-2007 
0.0687 0.379 0.326** 2.175   
Pos. Business Shock, 
2002-2007
+
 
-0.109 -1.020 0.124 1.537 0.184** 2.162 
ln(Distance to Village of 
Head’s Parents0) 
0.0304 0.748     
ln(Distance to Village of 
Spouse’s Parents0) 
0.0322 0.687     
ln(Years MFI Access) -0.647** -2.319 0.0820 1.167 -0.0495 -0.556 
       
Constant 5.233*** 4.314 4.562*** 3.800 5.284*** 6.768 
R
2
 0.159  0.186  0.156  
Observations 263  691  446  
       
Note:  Asterisks denote levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  ―Life‖ and ―business‖ shocks are 
idiosyncratic to a household, while ―covariate‖ shocks represent village-level events.  Expenditures, livestock, 
poultry, equipment, jewelry, and land are measured as values in taka. 
+
In the FFE Study, these shocks include events occurring only in the years 2003-2007. 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
Table 17.  Growth Model Excluding and Including Years of MFI, All Sites. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Change in Livelihood 
MFI Study Ag Tech Study FFE Study 
Including Excluding Including Excluding Including Excluding 
       
ln(Expenditures0) -0.414*** -0.365*** -0.832*** -0.837*** -0.650*** -0.641*** 
ln(Livestock0) 0.0312** 0.0256** -0.00694 -0.00689 0.00333 0.00352 
ln(Poultry0) 0.000768 -0.00216 0.000452 0.00125 0.00150 0.00113 
ln(Equipment0) 0.000711 -0.0120 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.0912** 0.0894** 
ln(Jewelry0) 0.0369** 0.0372** 0.0340* 0.0350* 0.0265** 0.0267** 
ln(Land0) -0.0101 -0.0166 0.0635*** 0.0624*** 0.0194** 0.0182** 
ln(Household Size0) 0.148 0.157 -0.0234 -0.0355 -0.340*** -0.331*** 
ln(Age of Head0) -0.106 -0.0733 -0.122 -0.118 -0.178 -0.181 
ln(Education of Head0) 0.107* 0.117** 0.122*** 0.118*** 0.0680** 0.0680** 
Male Household Head -0.330* -0.276* -0.209 -0.218 -0.232 -0.241* 
Neg. Covariate Shock, 
1996-2001 
0.353** 0.233 -0.0379 -0.0217   
Neg. Covariate Shock, 
2002-2007
+ 
0.0367 -0.0902 0.00789 0.00319 -0.0952 -0.0949 
Neg. Life Shock, 1996-
2001 
-0.203* -0.180 -0.103 -0.102   
Neg. Life Shock, 2002-
2007
+
 
-0.0104 -0.0217 0.0402 0.0387 0.0190 0.0185 
Neg. Business Shock, 
1996-2007 
-0.104 -0.0959 -0.150 -0.141   
Neg. Business Shock, 
2002-2007
+
 
0.121 0.180 -0.0194 -0.0223 -0.0445 -0.0392 
Pos. Life Shock,   1996-
2001 
-0.108 -0.0863 0.108 0.0985   
Pos. Life Shock,   2002-
2007
+
 
-0.0442 -0.0277 -0.0106 -0.0101 0.178 0.179 
Pos. Business Shock, 
1996-2007 
0.0687 0.0700 0.326** 0.333**   
Pos. Business Shock, 
2002-2007
+
 
-0.109 -0.133 0.124 0.127 0.184** 0.180** 
ln(Distance to Village of 
Head’s Parents0) 
0.0304 0.0354     
ln(Distance to Village of 
Spouse’s Parents0) 
0.0322 0.00697     
ln(Years MFI Access) -0.647**  0.0820  -0.0495  
       
Constant 5.233*** 3.068*** 4.562*** 4.836*** 5.284*** 5.115*** 
R
2
 0.159 0.143 0.186 0.185 0.156 0.156 
Observations 263 263 691 691 446 446 
       
Note:  Asterisks denote levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  ―Life‖ and ―business‖ shocks are 
idiosyncratic to a household, while ―covariate‖ shocks represent village-level events.  Expenditures, livestock, 
poultry, equipment, jewelry, and land are measured as values in taka. 
+
In the FFE Study, these shocks include events occurring only in the years 2003-2007. 
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Table 18.  Comparison of Single and Additive MFI Duration Measures, All Sites. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Change in Livelihood 
MFI Study Ag Tech Study FFE Study 
Single Additive Single Additive Single Additive 
       
ln(Expenditures0) -0.414*** -0.374*** -0.832*** -0.831*** -0.650*** -0.650*** 
ln(Livestock0) 0.0312** 0.0263** -0.00694 -0.00650 0.00333 0.00295 
ln(Poultry0) 0.000768 -0.00275 0.000452 0.00193 0.00150 0.00184 
ln(Equipment0) 0.000711 -0.00742 0.131*** 0.129*** 0.0912** 0.0911** 
ln(Jewelry0) 0.0369** 0.0378** 0.0340* 0.0333* 0.0265** 0.0265** 
ln(Land0) -0.0101 -0.0147 0.0635*** 0.0638*** 0.0194** 0.0193** 
ln(Household Size0) 0.148 0.157 -0.0234 -0.0209 -0.340*** -0.336*** 
ln(Age of Head0) -0.106 -0.0865 -0.122 -0.130 -0.178 -0.178 
ln(Education of Head0) 0.107* 0.114** 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.0680** 0.0688** 
Male Household Head -0.330* -0.295* -0.209 -0.208 -0.232 -0.235* 
Neg. Covariate Shock, 
1996-2001 
0.353** 0.289* -0.0379 -0.0502   
Neg. Covariate Shock, 
2002-2007
+ 
0.0367 -0.0631 0.00789 0.00292 -0.0952 -0.0965 
Neg. Life Shock, 1996-
2001 
-0.203* -0.188 -0.103 -0.105   
Neg. Life Shock, 2002-
2007
+
 
-0.0104 -0.0180 0.0402 0.0386 0.0190 0.0183 
Neg. Business Shock, 
1996-2007 
-0.104 -0.0913 -0.150 -0.160*   
Neg. Business Shock, 
2002-2007
+
 
0.121 0.171 -0.0194 -0.0217 -0.0445 -0.0449 
Pos. Life Shock,   1996-
2001 
-0.108 -0.0977 0.108 0.107   
Pos. Life Shock,   2002-
2007
+
 
-0.0442 -0.0306 -0.0106 -0.0159 0.178 0.177 
Pos. Business Shock, 
1996-2007 
0.0687 0.0664 0.326** 0.323**   
Pos. Business Shock, 
2002-2007
+
 
-0.109 -0.130 0.124 0.121 0.184** 0.183** 
ln(Distance to Village of 
Head’s Parents0) 
0.0304 0.0335     
ln(Distance to Village of 
Spouse’s Parents0) 
0.0322 0.0115     
ln(Years MFI Access) -0.647** -0.161 0.0820 0.0932 -0.0495 -0.0353 
       
Constant 5.233*** 3.741*** 4.562*** 4.492*** 5.284*** 5.271*** 
R
2
 0.159 0.145 0.186 0.187 0.156 0.157 
Observations 263 263 691 691 446 446 
       
Note:  Asterisks denote levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  ―Life‖ and ―business‖ shocks are 
idiosyncratic to a household, while ―covariate‖ shocks represent village-level events.  Expenditures, livestock, 
poultry, equipment, jewelry, and land are measured as values in taka. 
+
In the FFE Study, these shocks include events occurring only in the years 2003-2007. 
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Table 19.  Variance Inflation Factors of Growth Model Variables, All Sites. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Change in Livelihood 
MFI Study Ag Tech Study FFE Study 
    
ln(Expenditures0) 2.00 1.44 1.67 
ln(Livestock0) 1.64 1.36 1.17 
ln(Poultry0) 1.29 1.24 1.12 
ln(Equipment0) 1.67 1.47 1.57 
ln(Jewelry0) 1.63 1.27 1.40 
ln(Land0) 1.98 1.61 1.39 
ln(Household Size0) 1.89 1.73 1.33 
ln(Age of Head0) 1.47 1.23 1.16 
ln(Education of Head0) 1.70 1.46 1.33 
Male H.H. Head0 1.25 1.12 1.21 
Neg. Covariate Shock, 
1996-2001 
2.66 1.36  
Neg. Covariate Shock, 
2002-2007
+ 
2.68 1.14 1.04 
Neg. Life Shock, 1996-
2001 
1.26 1.06  
Neg. Life Shock, 2002-
2007
+
 
1.21 1.09 1.07 
Neg. Business Shock, 
1996-2007 
1.23 1.16  
Neg. Business Shock, 
2002-2007
+
 
1.31 1.10 1.14 
Pos. Life Shock,   
1996-2001 
1.15 1.08  
Pos. Life Shock,   
2002-2007
+
 
1.18 1.04 1.09 
Pos. Business Shock, 
1996-2007 
1.10 1.05  
Pos. Business Shock, 
2002-2007
+
 
1.18 1.12 1.06 
ln(Distance to Village 
of Head’s Parents0) 
1.15   
ln(Distance to Village 
of Spouse’s Parents0) 
1.21   
ln(Years MFI Access) 2.46 1.15 1.10 
    
Mean VIF 1.58 1.25 1.24 
    
+
In the FFE Study, these shocks include events occurring only in the years 2003-2007. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1.  Relationship of Assets to Expenditures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Two Stylized Asset Accumulation Trajectories. 
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Figure 3.  Map of Thanas Surveyed in MFI, Ag Tech, and FFE Studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Center for International Earth Science Information Network (2005). 
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Figure 4.  Household Transitions Out of Asset Poverty. 
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Figure 5.  Asset Dynamics with Fixed Effects Estimator.  
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Figure 6.  Asset Dynamics with Fixed Effects Estimator Omitting Time Trend, All Sites. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1.  Comparison of Asset Index Estimators, MFI Study. 
 
Variable Fixed Effects Random Effects Pooled OLS 
    
Livestock -2.61e-06 2.11e-07 -3.30e-07 
Livestock 2 6.00e-11 4.73e-11 6.32e-11 
Poultry -0.000424* 2.44e-05 7.71e-05 
Poultry 2 2.66e-07** 3.34e-09 -3.58e-08 
Equipment 1.53e-06 7.55e-06 9.46e-06 
Equipment 2 5.95e-11 5.07e-11 4.09e-11 
Jewelry 2.04e-05*** 2.23e-05*** 2.25e-05*** 
Jewelry 2 -1.02e-10* -1.18e-10* -1.13e-10* 
Land 4.40e-07** 3.69e-07*** 3.52e-07*** 
Land 2 -5.65e-14*** -3.70e-14*** -3.25e-14** 
Household Size -0.141** -0.132*** -0.139*** 
Household Size 2 0.000523 0.00393 0.00459 
Age of Head 0.0243 0.0180 0.0173 
Age of Head 2 -0.000267 -0.000167 -0.000165 
Education of Head 0.0751 0.00835 0.000677 
Education of Head 2 -0.00646* 0.00261 0.00312 
Male Household Head 0.289 0.0806 0.0919 
Second Round 0.603*** 0.401*** 0.395*** 
Distance to Village of 
Head’s Parents 
0.00434 0.000955 0.00219 
Distance to Village of 
Head’s Parents 2 
-5.91e-05* -1.18e-05 -1.55e-05 
Distance to Village of 
Spouse’s Parents 
-0.000183 0.00174 0.00182 
Distance to Village of 
Spouse’s Parents 2 
-8.27e-06 -6.19e-06 -6.59e-06 
    
Thana relative to Bahubal    
      Ulipur  -0.245*** -0.252*** 
      Rajarhat  -0.214*** -0.224*** 
      Shaturia  0.119 0.108 
      Trishal  -0.207*** -0.221*** 
    
Constant 0.815 0.877*** 0.916*** 
Observations 568 568 568 
R2 0.630  0.618 
Overall R2 0.3467 0.6169  
Between R2 0.2192 0.612  
Within R2 0.6302 0.568  
    
Note:  Asterisks denote levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.   
 
110 
 
 Table A.2.  Comparison of Asset Index Estimators, Ag Tech Study. 
 
Variable Fixed Effects Random Effects Pooled OLS 
    
Livestock 3.97e-06* 5.79e-06*** 5.81e-06*** 
Livestock 
2 
-1.725e-11** -1.648e-11*** -1.637e-11*** 
Poultry -6.18e-05 4.23e-05 4.42e-05 
Poultry 
2
 1.31e-09 -4.63e-10 -4.95e-10 
Equipment 1.73e-06 1.96e-06 1.97e-06 
Equipment 
2
 -1.268e-12 -1.130e-12 -1.125e-12 
Jewelry 1.36e-05*** 1.48e-05*** 1.48e-05*** 
Jewelry 
2
 -2.251e-11*** -3.022e-11*** -3.037e-11*** 
Land 3.78e-07*** 3.79e-07*** 3.78e-07*** 
Land 
2
 -4.616e-14*** -4.375e-14*** -4.350e-14*** 
Household Size -0.407*** -0.138*** -0.137*** 
Household Size 
2
 0.0106*** 0.00383** 0.00382** 
Age of Head 0.0235* 0.0219*** 0.0218*** 
Age of Head 
2
 -0.000184 -0.000156* -0.000156* 
Education of Head 0.0987** 0.0435** 0.0435** 
Education of Head 
2
 -0.00580** 0.000267 0.000258 
Male Household Head -0.121 0.00533 0.00699 
Second Round 0.818*** 0.480*** 0.479*** 
    
Thana relative to Jessore Sadar    
     Saturia  -0.131*** -0.132*** 
     Pakundia  -0.250*** -0.250*** 
     Gaffargaon  0.0431 0.0438 
    
Constant 2.087*** 0.825*** 0.823*** 
Observations 1,641 1,641 1,641 
R
2
 0.493  0.396 
Overall R
2
 0.225 0.396  
Between R
2
 0.117 0.36  
Within R
2
 0.493 0.445  
    
Note:  Asterisks denote levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.   
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Table A.3.  Comparison of Asset Index Estimators, FFE Study. 
 
Variable Fixed Effects Random Effects Pooled OLS 
    
Livestock 9.89e-07 1.79e-06 1.64e-06 
Livestock 
2 
-1.178e-11 -9.557e-12 -4.253e-12 
Poultry 8.82e-05 0.000110* 0.000117* 
Poultry 
2
 -3.19e-09 -9.49e-09 -1.20e-08 
Equipment 1.65e-05 2.95e-05*** 3.19e-05*** 
Equipment 
2
 8.15e-11 -9.47e-11 -1.20e-10 
Jewelry -6.12e-06 3.15e-06 5.98e-06 
Jewelry 
2
 1.78e-10*** 8.54e-11 5.72e-11 
Land 2.05e-07 6.09e-07*** 6.52e-07*** 
Land 
2
 -1.665e-14 -1.004e-13*** -1.152e-13*** 
Household Size -0.0535** -0.0630*** -0.0667*** 
Household Size 
2
 0.000702** 0.000815*** 0.000881*** 
Age of Head -0.0236** -0.0215** -0.0199** 
Age of Head 
2
 0.000180 0.000180** 0.000166** 
Education of Head 0.0310 0.0181 0.0159 
Education of Head 
2
 -0.000895 0.00329 0.00336* 
Male Household Head 0.0913 -0.0419 -0.0556 
Second Round 0.290*** 0.232*** 0.224*** 
    
Thana relative to Chakaria    
      Nilphamari Sadar  -0.0922 -0.0837 
      Mohadebpur  0.0239 0.0254 
      Sherpur Sadar  -0.102 -0.100 
      Madhupur  0.106 0.111 
      Nayagati  0.271*** 0.273*** 
      Agioljhara  -0.168** -0.160** 
      Hazigonj  0.0461 0.0395 
    
Constant 1.877*** 1.790*** 1.765*** 
Observations 909 909 909 
R
2
 0.309  0.465 
Overall R
2
 0.342 0.464  
Between R
2
 0.363 0.531  
Within R
2
 0.309 0.28  
    
Note:  Asterisks denote levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.   
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Figure A.1.  Asset Dynamics in the MFI Study: Comparison of Estimators.  
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Figure A.2.  Asset Dynamics in the Ag Tech Study: Comparison of Estimators.  
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Figure A.3.  Asset Dynamics in the FFE Study: Comparison of Estimators.  
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Figure A.4.  Lowess Estimator with First-Degree Local Polynomial 95% Confidence Intervals.  
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Figure A.5.  Asset Dynamics with Separate OLS Estimators By Round, All Sites. 
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